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A generalized Tullock contest

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  • Subhasish M. Chowdhury

    ()
    (School of Economics, University of East Anglia)

  • Roman M. Sheremeta

    ()
    (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University)

Abstract

We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. This structure nests a number of existing contests in the literature and can be used to analyze new types of contests. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and show that small parameter modifications may lead to substantially different types of contests and hence different equilibrium effort levels.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Chapman University, Economic Science Institute in its series Working Papers with number 10-08.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:10-08

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Keywords: rent-seeking; contest; spillover;

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References

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  1. Sheremeta, Roman M., 2010. "Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 731-747, March.
  2. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-306, December.
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  18. Cohen, Chen & Sela, Aner, 2005. "Manipulations in contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 135-139, January.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Gill, David & Stone, Rebecca, 2009. "Fairness and desert in tournaments," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0903, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  2. Christian Rusche, 2011. "Does Delegation Help to Prevent Spiteful Behavior?," Ruhr Economic Papers, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen 0270, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  3. XiaoGang Che & Brad Humphreys, 2014. "Contests with a Prize Externality and Stochastic Entry," Working Papers 14-19, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  4. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2011. "Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 216-219, August.
  5. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "The Equivalence of Contests," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute 10-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  6. Lacomba, Juan A. & Lagos, Francisco & Reuben, Ernesto & van Winden, Frans, 2013. "On the Escalation and De-Escalation of Conflict," IZA Discussion Papers 7492, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Gregor, Martin, 2012. "Contest for power in organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 280-283.

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