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Manipulations in contests

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  • Cohen, Chen
  • Sela, Aner
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

    Volume (Year): 86 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 135-139

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:86:y:2005:i:1:p:135-139

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    1. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June.
    2. Christian Groh & Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Uwe Sunde, 2012. "Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 59-80, January.
    3. Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G., 1995. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 311.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    4. Gradstein, Mark & Konrad, Kai A, 1999. "Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 536-45, October.
    5. Stefan Szymanski, 2003. "The Economic Design of Sporting Contests," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1137-1187, December.
    6. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1992. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics 9-92-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    7. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June.
    8. Amegashie, J Atsu, 1999. " The Design of Rent-Seeking Competitions: Committees, Preliminary and Final Contests," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 63-76, April.
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    Cited by:
    1. Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Diego Moreno & Aner Sela & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2013. "Tullock Contests With Asymmetric Information," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics 1303, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    2. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2011. "Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 216-219, August.
    3. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Sad-Loser Lottery," Working Papers, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics 204, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2008.
    4. Amegashie, J. Atsu & Kutsoati, Edward, 2007. "(Non)intervention in intra-state conflicts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 754-767, September.
    5. Sheremeta, Roman & Chowdhury, Subhasish, 2010. "A generalized Tullock contest," MPRA Paper 52102, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Matros, Alexander, 2012. "Sad-Loser contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 155-162.
    7. Cohen, Chen & Sela, Aner, 2005. "Allocation of Prizes in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 4951, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Einy, E & Haimanko, O & Moreno, D & Sela, A & Shitovitz, B, 2013. "Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 2013-11, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    9. Amegashie, J. Atsu & Runkel, Marco, 2008. "The Desire for Revenge and the Dynamics of Conflicts," MPRA Paper 6746, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Cohen, Chen & Sela, Aner, 2008. "Allocation of prizes in asymmetric all-pay auctions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 123-132, March.
    11. Subhashish Modak Chowdhury & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2009. "A generalized Tullock contest and the existence of multiple equilibria," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS), School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 09-08, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    12. Alexander Matros & Daniel Armanios, 2009. "Tullock’s contest with reimbursements," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 49-63, October.
    13. Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Diego Moreno & A. Sela & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2013. "Tullock contests with asymmetric information," Economics Working Papers we1314, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.

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