Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Sad-Loser contests

Contents:

Author Info

  • Matros, Alexander

Abstract

We consider asymmetric winner-reimbursed contests. It turns out that such contests (Sad-Loser) have multiple internal pure-strategy equilibria (where at least two players are active). We describe all equilibria and discuss their properties. In particular, we find (1) that an active player is indifferent among all her non-negative choices and her expected payoff is zero in any internal equilibrium, (2) that a higher-value (stronger) player always spends less than a lower-value (weaker) player and therefore always has a lower chance to win a Sad-Loser contest in any internal equilibrium, and (3) a sufficient condition for a net total spending to be higher in a Sad-Loser contest than in the corresponding asymmetric contest.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406812000213
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 48 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 155-162

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:48:y:2012:i:3:p:155-162

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

Related research

Keywords: Lottery; Contest; Winner’s reward;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Addition or deletion of a player," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 369-380, December.
  2. Takeshi Yamazaki, 2008. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Rent-Seeking Contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 317-327, 04.
  3. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2003. "Optimal Design of Research Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 646-671, June.
  4. Taylor, Curtis R, 1995. "Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 872-90, September.
  5. Alexander Matros & Daniel Armanios, 2009. "Tullock’s contest with reimbursements," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 49-63, October.
  6. Kaplan, Todd, et al, 2002. "All-Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 417-30, December.
  7. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005. "Asymmetric contests with general technologies," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
  8. Cohen, Chen & Sela, Aner, 2008. "Allocation of prizes in asymmetric all-pay auctions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 123-132, March.
  9. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics 8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  10. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
  11. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock D. & De Vries, C.G., 2000. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: an Auction-Theoretic Approach," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1137, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  12. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  13. John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 152, UCLA Department of Economics.
  14. Stein, William E, 2002. " Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More Than Two Contestants," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 325-36, December.
  15. Morgan, John, 2000. "Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(4), pages 761-84, October.
  16. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June.
  17. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2011. "Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 216-219, August.
  18. Cohen, Chen & Sela, Aner, 2005. "Manipulations in contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 135-139, January.
  19. Nti, Kofi O, 1999. " Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-30, March.
  20. Duncan, Brian, 2002. " Pumpkin Pies and Public Goods: The Raffle Fundraising Strategy," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 111(1-2), pages 49-71, March.
  21. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
  22. Fang, Hanming, 2002. " Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Models of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 112(3-4), pages 351-71, September.
  23. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603, October.
  24. Domenico Menicucci, 2006. "Banning Bidders from All-pay Auctions," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 89-94, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2011. "Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 216-219, August.
  2. Alexander Matros & Daniel Armanios, 2007. "Tullock's Contest with Reimbursements," Working Papers, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics 328, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2008.
  3. Subhashish Modak Chowdhury & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2009. "A generalized Tullock contest and the existence of multiple equilibria," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS), School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 09-08, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:48:y:2012:i:3:p:155-162. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.