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Tullock's Contest with Reimbursements

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Author Info
Alexander Matros
Daniel Armanios
Abstract

We consider Tullock’s contests with reimbursements. It turns out that the winner-reimbursed contest maximizes the net total spending while the loser-reimbursed contest minimizes the net total spending. We investigate properties of contests with reimbursements and compare them with the classic Tullock’s contest. Applications for R&D, government contracts, and elections are discussed.

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Paper provided by University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 328.

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Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision: Sep 2008
Handle: RePEc:pit:wpaper:328

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances

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  1. Kaplan, Todd, et al, 2002. "All-Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(4), pages 417-30, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Stefan Szymanski, 2003. "The Economic Design of Sporting Contests," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1137-1187, December.
  3. Cohen, Chen & Sela, Aner, 2005. "Manipulations in contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 135-139, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Thomas Cusack & Amihai Glazer & Kai Konrad, 2007. "Introduction," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 179-179, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Fearon, James D, 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, Summer.
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