All-Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards
AbstractWe study all-pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder's privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.
Volume (Year): 50 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821
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- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
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