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A generalized Tullock contest

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  • Sheremeta, Roman
  • Chowdhury, Subhasish

Abstract

We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. This structure nests a number of existing contests in the literature and can be used to analyze new types of contests. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and show that small parameter modifications may lead to substantially different types of contests and hence different equilibrium effort levels.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 52102.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:52102

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Keywords: rent-seeking; contest; spillover;

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References

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  1. Alexander Matros & Daniel Armanios, 2007. "Tullock's Contest with Reimbursements," Working Papers, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics 328, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2008.
  2. Sheremeta, Roman, 2009. "Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests," MPRA Paper 49884, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2004. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Working Papers, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy 2004-24, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  4. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & JACQUEMIN, Alexis, . "Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -823, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603, October.
  6. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September.
  7. Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
  8. Kaplan, Todd, et al, 2002. "All-Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 417-30, December.
  9. Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997. "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 201-204.
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  11. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
  12. Sheremeta, Roman, 2009. "Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation," MPRA Paper 52101, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Cohen, Chen & Sela, Aner, 2005. "Manipulations in contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 135-139, January.
  14. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-306, December.
  15. Michelle R Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000011, David K. Levine.
  16. Amegashie, J Atsu, 1999. " The Number of Rent-Seekers and Aggregate Rent-Seeking Expenditures: An Unpleasant Result," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 57-62, April.
  17. Glazer, Amihai & Konrad, Kai A., 1999. "Taxation of rent-seeking activities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 61-72, April.
  18. Baye, Michael R. & Kovenock, Dan & Vries, Casper G. de, 2009. "Contests with rank-order spillovers," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2009-09, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  19. Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August.
  20. Skaperdas, Stergios & Gan, Li, 1995. "Risk Aversion in Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(431), pages 951-62, July.
  21. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1996. " Rent-Seeking Contest When the Prize Increases with Aggregate Efforts," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 55-66, April.
  22. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1999. " Legal Expenditure as a Rent-Seeking Game," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 100(3-4), pages 271-88, September.
  23. Lee, Sanghack & Hyeong Kang, J., 1998. "Collective contests with externalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 727-738, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Gill, David & Stone, Rebecca, 2009. "Fairness and desert in tournaments," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0903, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  2. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2011. "Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 216-219, August.
  3. Christian Rusche, 2011. "Does Delegation Help to Prevent Spiteful Behavior?," Ruhr Economic Papers, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen 0270, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  4. Subhashish Modak Chowdhury & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2009. "The equivalence of contests," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS), School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 09-06, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  5. Lacomba, Juan A. & Lagos, Francisco & Reuben, Ernesto & van Winden, Frans, 2014. "On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 40-57.
  6. Gregor, Martin, 2012. "Contest for power in organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 280-283.
  7. XiaoGang Che & Brad Humphreys, 2014. "Contests with a Prize Externality and Stochastic Entry," Working Papers 14-19, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.

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