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Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict

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  • Kimbrough, Erik
  • Sheremeta, Roman

Abstract

Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties may prefer to resolve the dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments, generating settlements that strongly favor proposers. When side-payments are non-binding, proposers offer nothing and conflicts always arise. Laboratory experiments confirm that binding side-payments reduce conflicts. However, 30% of responders reject binding offers, and offers are more egalitarian than predicted. Surprisingly, non-binding side-payments also improve efficiency, although less than binding. With binding side-payments, 87% of efficiency gains come from avoided conflicts. However, with non-binding side-payments, only 39% of gains come from avoided conflicts and 61% from reduced conflict expenditures.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 46808.

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Date of creation: 03 Feb 2013
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:46808

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Keywords: contests; conflict resolution; side-payments; experiments;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Shields, Timothy W., 2014. "When parity promotes peace: Resolving conflict between asymmetric agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 96-108.
  2. Lacomba, Juan A. & Lagos, Francisco & Reuben, Ernesto & van Winden, Frans, 2013. "On the Escalation and De-Escalation of Conflict," IZA Discussion Papers 7492, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2014. "Behavioral Dimensions of Contests," Working Papers 14-14, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  4. Sheremeta, Roman, 2013. "Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments," MPRA Paper 44124, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Mago, Shakun & Sheremeta, Roman & Yates, Andrew, 2012. "Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic versus Psychological Momentum," MPRA Paper 43031, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Erik O. Kimbrough & Jared Rubin & Roman M. Sheremeta & Timothy Shields, 2013. "Commitment Problems in Conflict Resolution," Working Papers 13-11, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  7. Erik O Kimbrough & Roman M Sheremeta, 2014. "Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict," Working Papers 14-01, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  8. Smith, Adam C. & Houser, Daniel & Leeson, Peter T. & Ostad, Ramin, 2014. "The costs of conflict," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 61-71.
  9. Erik O. Kimbrough & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2012. "Why Can’t We Be Friends? Entitlements, bargaining, and conflict," Working Papers 12-16, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  10. Sheremeta, Roman, 2014. "Behavior in Contests," MPRA Paper 57451, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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