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Sustaining cooperation in trust games

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  • Rigdon, Mary
  • McCabe, Kevin
  • Smith, Vernon

Abstract

It is well-known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner's Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Without knowing it, players are typed based on their recent track record as to whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). They are then paired according to those types: trustors with trustworthy types, and similarly non-trustors with untrustworthy types. In the control comparisons, Players 1 are randomly repaired with Players 2 without regard to type. We ask: are there natural tendencies for people to cooperate more frequently in environments in which they experience more cooperation in comparison with controls?

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 2006.

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Date of creation: Aug 2001
Date of revision: 23 Apr 2006
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2006

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Keywords: exchange; trust; reciprocity; cooperation; clustering; bargaining; experimental economics;

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References

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  1. Selten, Reinhard & Stoecker, Rolf, 1986. "End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-70, March.
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  7. Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon, 1994. "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 346-380, November.
  8. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
  9. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
  10. Ahn, T K, et al, 2001. " Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 106(1-2), pages 137-55, January.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Paganelli, Maria Pia, 2011. "The same face of the two Smiths: Adam Smith and Vernon Smith," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 246-255, May.
  2. Michał Krawczyk, 2013. "Delineating deception in experimental economics: Researchers' and subjects' views," Working Papers, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw 2013-11, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
  3. Erik O. Kimbrough & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2012. "Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute 12-01, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  4. Bergh, Andreas & Engseld, Peter, 2005. "The Problem of Cooperation and Reputation Based Choice," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2005:27, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 04 May 2006.
  5. Rodet, Cortney Stephen, 2013. "Seniority, Information and Electoral Accountability," MPRA Paper 49863, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Smith, Vernon L., 2010. "Theory and experiment: What are the questions?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 3-15, January.
  7. Ochea, Marius-Ionut, 2013. "Evolution of repeated prisoner's dilemma play under logit dynamics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2483-2499.
  8. Bart J. Wilson & Taylor Jaworski & Karl E. Schurter & Andrew Smyth, 2012. "The Ecological and Civil Mainsprings of Property: An Experimental Economic History of Whalers' Rules of Capture," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(4), pages 617-656, October.
  9. Taylor Jaworski & Bart J. Wilson, 2009. "Go West Young Man: Self-selection and Endogenous Property Rights," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute 09-02, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  10. Grimm, Veronika & Mengel, Friederike, 2011. "Matching technology and the choice of punishment institutions in a prisoner's dilemma game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 333-348, May.
  11. Kimbrough Erik O. & Vostroknutov Alexander, 2012. "Using Rules to Screen for Cooperative Types: Rule-Following and Restraint in Common Pool Resource Systems," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) 055, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  12. Rietz, Thomas & Sheremeta, Roman & Shields, Timothy & Smith, Vernon, 2013. "Transparency, Efficiency and the Distribution of Economic Welfare in Pass-Through Investment Trust Games," MPRA Paper 53594, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Engseld, Peter & Bergh, Andreas, 2005. "Choosing Opponents in Games of Cooperation and Coordination," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2005:1, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 03 May 2005.
  14. Brown, M. & Serra Garcia, M., 2010. "Relational Contracting Under the Threat of Expropriation – Experimental Evidence," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2010-85, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  15. Engseld, Peter & Bergh, Andreas, 2005. "Choosing Opponents in Prisoners' Dilemma: An Evolutionary Analysis," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2005:45, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  16. Stahl, Dale O. & Haruvy, Ernan, 2008. "Level-n bounded rationality in two-player two-stage games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 41-61, January.
  17. Erik O. Kimbrough & Roman Sheremeta, 2010. "Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: Avoiding Conflicts through Side Payments," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute 10-23, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.

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