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Sustaining cooperation in trust games

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Author Info
Rigdon, Mary
McCabe, Kevin
Smith, Vernon

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Abstract

It is well-known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner's Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Without knowing it, players are typed based on their recent track record as to whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). They are then paired according to those types: trustors with trustworthy types, and similarly non-trustors with untrustworthy types. In the control comparisons, Players 1 are randomly repaired with Players 2 without regard to type. We ask: are there natural tendencies for people to cooperate more frequently in environments in which they experience more cooperation in comparison with controls?

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2006/
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 2006.

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Date of creation: Aug 2001
Date of revision: 23 Apr 2006
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2006

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Keywords: exchange trust reciprocity cooperation clustering bargaining experimental economics

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
D0 - Microeconomics - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocitys," IEW - Working Papers iewwp040, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon, 1994. "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 346-380, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Selten, Reinhard & Stoecker, Rolf, 1986. "End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-70, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gary Charness, 1998. "Bargaining Efficiency and Screening: An Experimental Investigation," Economics Working Papers 284, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. McCabe, Kevin A. & Rassenti, Stephen J. & Smith, Vernon L., 1998. "Reciprocity, Trust, and Payoff Privacy in Extensive Form Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 10-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ahn, T K, et al, 2001. " Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(1-2), pages 137-55, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Gunnthorsdottir, Anna & Houser, Daniel & McCabe, Kevin, 2007. "Disposition, history and contributions in public goods experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 304-315, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Wiseman, Thomas & Yilankaya, Okan, 2001. "Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 216-242, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Miller, John H., 1996. "The coevolution of automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 87-112, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L, 1996. "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 653-60, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Andreoni, James A & Miller, John H, 1993. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(418), pages 570-85, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. repec:att:wimass:19199918 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Schmidt, David & Shupp, Robert & Walker, James & Ahn, T. K. & Ostrom, Elinor, 2001. "Dilemma games: game parameters and matching protocols," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 357-377, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bergh, Andreas & Engseld, Peter, 2005. "The Problem of Cooperation and Reputation Based Choice," Working Papers 2005:27, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 04 May 2006. [Downloadable!]
  2. Engseld, Peter & Bergh, Andreas, 2005. "Choosing Opponents in Prisoners' Dilemma: An Evolutionary Analysis," Working Papers 2005:45, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Engseld, Peter & Bergh, Andreas, 2005. "Choosing Opponents in Games of Cooperation and Coordination," Working Papers 2005:1, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 03 May 2005.
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