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Theorizing About Conflict

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Author Info
Jack Hirshleifer (UCLA)
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File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp727.pdf
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 727.

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Date of creation: 01 Feb 1995
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:727

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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Baik, Kyung H & Shogren, Jason F, 1992. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 359-62, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Skogh, Goran & Stuart, Charles, 1982. " A Contractarian Theory of Property Rights and Crime," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 84(1), pages 27-40.
  5. Jack Hirshleifer, 1978. "Natural Economy Versus Political Economy," UCLA Economics Working Papers 114, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Jack Hirshleifer, 1978. "Natural Economy Versus Political Economy," UCLA Economics Working Papers 129, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Intriligator, Michael D, 1975. "Strategic Considerations in the Richardson Model of Arms Races," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 339-53, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    Other versions:
  11. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Jean-Franois, MAYSTADT, 2007. "Does inequality make us rebel ? A renewed theoretical model applied to South Mexico," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007041, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
  2. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene, 2002. "Battlefields And Marketplaces," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 13(6), pages 485-496, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Héctor Galindo Silva, 2007. "Polarización económica y emergencia de confilctos violentos internos un estudio empírico," DOCUMENTOS DE ECONOMÍA 004449, UNIVERSIDAD JAVERIANA - BOGOTÁ. [Downloadable!]
  4. Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Bargaining Versus Fighting," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 657-676, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Joshua Aizenman & Reuven Glick, 2003. "Military expenditure, threats, and growth," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 2003-08, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Jean-François Maystadt, 2008. "Does inequality make us rebel? A revisited theoretical model applied to South Mexico," HiCN Working Papers 41, Households in Conflict Network. [Downloadable!]
  7. Robert MacCulloch & Silvia Pezzini, 2002. "The Role of Freedom, Growth and Religion in the Taste for Revolution," STICERD - Development Economics Papers 36, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Robert MacCulloch & Silvia Pezzini, 2007. "Money, religion and revolution," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 1-16, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Klaus Abbink & Silvia Pezzini, 2005. "Determinants of Revolt: Evidence from Survey and Laboratory Data," Discussion Papers 2005-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  11. Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padro i Miquel, 2008. "Conflict and Deterrence under Strategic Risk," NBER Working Papers 13964, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Sherrill Shaffer, 2006. "Contests with interdependent preferences," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 13(13), pages 877-880, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Vincent Medina & Cyr-Denis Nidier, 2003. "Pricing war within a real option framework * The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect those of the French Ministry of Defence," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 14(6), pages 425-435, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Charles Anderton, 2003. "Economic Theorizing Of Conflict: Historical Contributions, Future Possibilities," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 14(3), pages 209-222, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Fanny Coulomb & Jacques Fontanel, 2003. "Disarmament: A Century Of Economic Thought," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 14(3), pages 193-208, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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