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Bribing potential entrants in a rent-seeking contest

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  • Lambert Schoonbeek

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Lambert Schoonbeek, 2009. "Bribing potential entrants in a rent-seeking contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 153-158, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:139:y:2009:i:1:p:153-158
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9385-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eso, Peter & Schummer, James, 2004. "Bribing and signaling in second price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 299-324, May.
    2. Mark Bagnoli & Barton L. Lipman, 1989. "Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(4), pages 583-601.
    3. Chien-Liang Chen & Yair Tauman, 2006. "Collusion in one-shot second-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(1), pages 145-172, May.
    4. Stein, William E, 2002. "Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More Than Two Contestants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 325-336, December.
    5. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Addition or deletion of a player," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 369-380, December.
    6. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Doğan, Serhat & Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim & Sağlam, Çağrı, 2021. "Bribing in team contests," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 1-9.
    2. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2013. "Side-payments and the costs of conflict," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 278-286.
    3. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Shields, Timothy W., 2014. "When parity promotes peace: Resolving conflict between asymmetric agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 96-108.
    4. Patrick Maillé & Bruno Tuffin, 2017. "Preventing competition using side payments: when non-neutrality creates barriers to entry," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 3-22, May.
    5. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2013. "Contests With Doping," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 14(3), pages 253-275, June.
    6. Erik O. Kimbrough & Roman M. Sheremeta & Timothy Shields, 2011. "Resolving Conflicts by a Random Device," Working Papers 11-09, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rent-seeking contest; Entry; Bribing; D7;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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