Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Non-Partisan 'Get-Out-the-Vote' Efforts and Policy Outcomes

Contents:

Author Info

  • Dan Kovenock J.
  • Brian Roberson

Abstract

This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan ‘get-out-the-vote’ efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing participation in the electoral process, we find that they have a meaningful impact on policy outcomes and are an important political influence activity for nonprofit advocacy organizations. In equilibrium, nonpartisan gotv efforts are more likely to arise in those segments of the electorate that are sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante voter abstention rate). Among those segments in which such efforts arise, the resulting gains are increasing in the level of disenfranchisement of the voters in the segment and decreasing in the segment’s size.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2009/wp-cesifo-2009-10/cesifo1_wp2815.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2815.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2815

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Email:
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: get out the vote; redistributive politics; nonprofit advocacy organizations; Colonel Blotto Game; Tullock Game;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G., 1995. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 311.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  2. Barry Nalebuff & Roni Shachar, 1997. "Follow The Leader: Theory And Evidence On Political Participation," Yale School of Management Working Papers, Yale School of Management ysm57, Yale School of Management.
  3. Kovenock, Dan & Roberson, Brian, 2005. "Electoral poaching and party identification," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2005-17, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  4. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2001. "Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 67-82, January.
  5. Christian Schultz, 2007. "Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 936-963, 07.
  6. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Hillman, Arye L., 2010. "Expressive behavior in economics and politics," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 403-418, December.
  8. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, 1998. "Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 149-175, April.
  9. Helios Herrera & Andrea Mattozzi, 2010. "Quorum and Turnout in Referenda," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 8(4), pages 838-871, 06.
  10. Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2006. "Multi-battle contests," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1187, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  11. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-34, November.
  12. Rotemberg, Julio J., 2005. "Attitude-Dependent Altruism, Turnout and Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5146, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Katz, Eliakim & Tokatlidu, Julia, 1996. "Group competition for rents," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 599-607, December.
  14. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2010. "Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 1-7, February.
  15. Stein, William E, 2002. " Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More Than Two Contestants," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 325-36, December.
  16. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2007. "Inefficient Redistribution and Inefficient Redistributive Politics," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1206, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  17. Nicolas Sahuguet & Nicola Persico, 2006. "Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 95-124, 05.
  18. Brian Roberson, 2006. "The Colonel Blotto game," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 1-24, September.
  19. Crutzen, Benoît SY & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2006. "Redistributive Politics with Distortionary Taxation," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5975, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Brian Roberson, 2008. "Pork-Barrel Politics, Targetable Policies, and Fiscal Federalism," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 6(4), pages 819-844, 06.
  21. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R > 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research 9368, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  22. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April.
  23. Laslier, Jean-Francois & Picard, Nathalie, 2002. "Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 106-130, March.
  24. David Austen-Smith, 1987. "Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 123-139, January.
  25. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2005. "Heterogenous Groups and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers), LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1 2005.16, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
  26. Timothy J. Feddersen, 2004. "Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 99-112, Winter.
  27. James M. Buchanan, 1954. "Individual Choice in Voting and the Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 334.
  28. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
  29. Nti, Kofi O., 1998. "Effort and performance in group contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 769-781, November.
  30. David Str–mberg, 2004. "Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 265-284, 01.
  31. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Addition or deletion of a player," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 369-380, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2815. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.