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Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More Than Two Contestants

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Author Info
 Stein, William E
Abstract

This article considers a rent-seeking model with N asymmetric contestants. Each contestant may have a different valuation of the rent or a different relative ability to win the rent. One of the N contestants is selected as the winner based on Tullock's (1980) probabilistic contest rule with constant returns to scale. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium solution is obtained and its consequences are investigated. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 113 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (December)
Pages: 325-36
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:113:y:2002:i:3-4:p:325-36

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  1. J. Amegashie, 2006. "A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 135-144, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Marco Runkel, 2003. "Optimal Contest Design when the Designer's Payoff Depends on Competitive Balance," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Bennour, Khaled, 2008. "The Value of Rents and the Likelihood of Conflicts," MPRA Paper 15012, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Marco Runkel, 2006. "Optimal contest design, closeness and the contest success function," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 217-231, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Frode Meland & Odd Rune Straume, 2006. "Outsourcing in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Addition or deletion of a player," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 369-380, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Lambert Schoonbeek, 2009. "Bribing potential entrants in a rent-seeking contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 153-158, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Jörg Franke, 2007. "Does Affirmative Action Reduce Effort Incentives? A Contest Game Analysis," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 711.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  9. Amegashie, J.A., 2003. "A Contest Success Function with a Tractable Noise Parameter," Working Papers 2003-5, University of Guelph, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2007. "Tullock contests of weakly heterogeneous players," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 49-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Lambert Schoonbeek & Barbara Winkel, 2006. "Activity and inactivity in a rent-seeking contest with private information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 123-132, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Sad-Loser Lottery," Working Papers 204, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2008. [Downloadable!]
  13. Gil Epstein & Igal Milchtaich & Shmuel Nitzan & Mordechai Schwarz, 2007. "Ambiguous political power and contest efforts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 113-123, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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