Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Addition or deletion of a player
AbstractWe consider an extension of Tullock's (1980) N-player contest under which prize valuations may vary across players. We show that the pure-strategy equilibrium of this contest is unique. We also establish the following results: rent dissipation increases, individual winning probabilities decrease, and individual spending either increases or decreases with the addition of a player. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, B.V. 2006
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 129 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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