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On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests

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  • Boudreau, James W.
  • Shunda, Nicholas

Abstract

We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players' perceived prize valuations in contests. Evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize's material value and induce overexpenditure. We establish an equivalence between the behavior evolutionarily stable preferences induce and evolutionarily stable strategies.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 24640.

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Date of creation: 25 Aug 2010
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:24640

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Keywords: Contest; Prize valuation; Preference evolution; Evolutionarily stable preferences;

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Cited by:
  1. Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2013. "Evolutionary determinants of war," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 418, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

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