Evolutionary determinants of war
AbstractThis paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use Schafferâ€™s (1988) concept of evolutionary stability. We find that players â€˜evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 418.
Date of creation: 22 Apr 2013
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Conflict; Contest; Endogenous fighting; Balance of power; Evolutionary stability;
Other versions of this item:
- Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2013. "Evolutionary determinants of war," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2013-302, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2013-10-18 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-10-18 (Game Theory)
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