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Evolutionary Equilibrium in Tullock Contests: Spite and Overdissipation

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Author Info
Burkhard Hehenkamp
Wolfgang Leininger
Alex Possajennikov

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Abstract

Tullock's analysis of rent-seeking as a contest is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionary stable behavior in a Tullock contest exists and differs from behavior in Nash equilibrium. Evolutionary stable behavior in these contests is robust in a strong sense and may entail overdissipation of the contested rent.

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File URL: http://www.wiso.uni-dortmund.de/mik/de/content/forschung/DPSeries/PDF/03-01.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Dortmund, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 03_01.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2003
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Handle: RePEc:mik:wpaper:03_01

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  1. Frederik Schmidt, 2009. "Evolutionary stability of altruism and envy in Tullock contests," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 247-259, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jean-Philippe Atzenhoffer, 2008. "Evolutionary Stability in Common Pool Resources," Working Papers of BETA 2008-21, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
  3. Tobias Guse & Burkhard Hehenkamp, 2004. "On the Strategic Advantage of Interdependent Preferences in Rent-Seeking Contests," Discussion Papers in Economics 03_02, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Wolfgang Leininger, 2004. "Fending off one means fending off all:evolutionary stability in submodular games," Discussion Papers in Economics 04_03, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Xiaojing Kong, 2008. "Loss Aversion and Rent-Seeking: An Experimental Study," Discussion Papers 2008-13, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  6. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2008. "Contests with Rank-Order Spillovers," Working Papers 2008-20, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
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  7. John Morgan & Henrik Orzen & Martin Sefton, 2008. "Endogenous Entry in Contests," Discussion Papers 2008-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  8. Wolfgang Leininger, 2006. "Fending off one means fending off all: evolutionary stability in quasi-submodular aggregative games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 713-719, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Wolfgang Leininger, 2004. "Fending off one Means Fending off all: Evolutionary Stability in Submodular Games," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  10. Wolfgang Leininger, 2008. "Evolutionarily Stable Preferences in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  11. Wolfgang Leininger, 2008. "Evolutionarily Stable Preferences in Contests," Ruhr Economic Papers 0049, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen. [Downloadable!]
  12. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2005. "The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse35_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Alexander Matros & Wooyoung Lim & Theodore Turocy, 2009. "Raising Revenue With Raffles: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment," Working Papers 377, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2009. [Downloadable!]
  14. Tobias Guse & Burkhard Hehenkamp & Alex Possajennikov, 2008. "On the Equivalence of Nash and Evolutionary Equilibrium in Finite Populations," Discussion Papers 2008-06, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  15. Benedikt Herrmann & Henrik Orzen, 2008. "The appearance of homo rivalis: Social preferences and the nature of rent seeking," Discussion Papers 2008-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
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