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A generalized Tullock contest

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Author Info

  • Subhasish Chowdhury

    ()

  • Roman Sheremeta

Abstract

We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. This structure nests a number of existing contests in the literature and can be used to analyze new types of contests. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and show that small parameter modifications may lead to substantially different types of contests and hence different equilibrium effort levels.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-010-9636-3
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 147 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 413-420

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:147:y:2011:i:3:p:413-420

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

Related research

Keywords: Rent-seeking; Contest; Spillover; C72; D72; D74;

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References

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  2. Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G., 1995. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 311.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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  10. Sheremeta, Roman M., 2010. "Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 731-747, March.
  11. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1996. " Rent-Seeking Contest When the Prize Increases with Aggregate Efforts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 55-66, April.
  12. Skaperdas, Stergios & Gan, Li, 1995. "Risk Aversion in Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(431), pages 951-62, July.
  13. Michelle R Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000011, David K. Levine.
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  15. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-306, December.
  16. Sheremeta, Roman, 2009. "Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation," MPRA Paper 52101, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2008. "Contests with Rank-Order Spillovers," Working Papers 2008-20, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  18. Herschel I. Grossman & Juan Mendoza, 2001. "Butter and guns: Complementarity between economic and military competition," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 25-33, 03.
  19. Alexander Matros & Daniel Armanios, 2007. "Tullock's Contest with Reimbursements," Working Papers 328, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2008.
  20. Glazer, A. & Konrad, K.A., 1997. "Taxation of Rent-Seeking Activities," Papers 97-98-04, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  21. Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August.
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  23. Amegashie, J Atsu, 1999. " The Number of Rent-Seekers and Aggregate Rent-Seeking Expenditures: An Unpleasant Result," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 57-62, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Chowdhury, Subhasish & Sheremeta, Roman, 2011. "Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests," MPRA Paper 52104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Lacomba, Juan A. & Lagos, Francisco & Reuben, Ernesto & van Winden, Frans, 2013. "On the Escalation and De-Escalation of Conflict," IZA Discussion Papers 7492, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Christian Rusche, 2011. "Does Delegation Help to Prevent Spiteful Behavior?," Ruhr Economic Papers 0270, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  4. Gregor, Martin, 2012. "Contest for power in organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 280-283.
  5. Gill, David & Stone, Rebecca, 2010. "Fairness and Desert in Tournaments," MPRA Paper 21322, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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