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A generalized Tullock contest

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  • Subhasish Chowdhury

    ()

  • Roman Sheremeta

Abstract

We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. This structure nests a number of existing contests in the literature and can be used to analyze new types of contests. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and show that small parameter modifications may lead to substantially different types of contests and hence different equilibrium effort levels.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-010-9636-3
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 147 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 413-420

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:147:y:2011:i:3:p:413-420

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

Related research

Keywords: Rent-seeking; Contest; Spillover; C72; D72; D74;

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References

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  13. Baye, Michael R. & Kovenock, Dan & Vries, Casper G. de, 2009. "Contests with rank-order spillovers," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2009-09, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  14. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1996. " Rent-Seeking Contest When the Prize Increases with Aggregate Efforts," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 55-66, April.
  15. Alexander Matros & Daniel Armanios, 2007. "Tullock's Contest with Reimbursements," Working Papers 328, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2008.
  16. Garfinkel, M.R. & Skaperdas, S., 2000. "Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: how the Future Matters," Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences 99-00-11, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  17. Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997. "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 201-204.
  18. Amegashie, J Atsu, 1999. " The Number of Rent-Seekers and Aggregate Rent-Seeking Expenditures: An Unpleasant Result," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 57-62, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Gregor, Martin, 2012. "Contest for power in organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 280-283.
  2. Gill, David & Stone, Rebecca, 2010. "Fairness and Desert in Tournaments," MPRA Paper 21322, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Chowdhury, Subhasish & Sheremeta, Roman, 2011. "Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests," MPRA Paper 52104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Christian Rusche, 2011. "Does Delegation Help to Prevent Spiteful Behavior?," Ruhr Economic Papers, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen 0270, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  5. Lacomba, Juan A. & Lagos, Francisco & Reuben, Ernesto & van Winden, Frans, 2013. "On the Escalation and De-Escalation of Conflict," IZA Discussion Papers 7492, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Subhashish Modak Chowdhury & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2009. "The equivalence of contests," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 09-06, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  7. XiaoGang Che & Brad Humphreys, 2014. "Contests with a Prize Externality and Stochastic Entry," Working Papers 14-19, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.

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