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Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests

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  • Chowdhury, Subhasish M.
  • Sheremeta, Roman M.

Abstract

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 112 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 216-219

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:2:p:216-219

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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Keywords: Rent-seeking Contest Asymmetric equilibrium Multiple equilibria;

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References

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  1. Matros, Alexander, 2012. "Sad-Loser contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 155-162.
  2. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005. "Asymmetric contests with general technologies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
  3. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2004. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Working Papers 2004-24, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  4. Mark Gradstein, 1995. "Intensity Of Competition, Entry And Entry Deterrence In Rent Seeking Contests," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 79-91, 03.
  5. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
  6. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Okuguchi, Koji, 1997. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 135-140, January.
  7. Subhasish Chowdhury & Roman Sheremeta, 2011. "A generalized Tullock contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 413-420, June.
  8. Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997. "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 201-204.
  9. Glazer, Amihai & Konrad, Kai A., 1999. "Taxation of rent-seeking activities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 61-72, April.
  10. Alexander Matros & Daniel Armanios, 2007. "Tullock's Contest with Reimbursements," Working Papers 328, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2008.
  11. Nti, Kofi O, 1999. " Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-30, March.
  12. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1996. " Rent-Seeking Contest When the Prize Increases with Aggregate Efforts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 55-66, April.
  13. Cohen, Chen & Sela, Aner, 2005. "Manipulations in contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 135-139, January.
  14. Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August.
  15. Paul, Chris & Wilhite, Al, 1990. " Efficient Renk-Seeking under Varying Cost Structures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(3), pages 279-90, March.
  16. Amegashie, J Atsu, 1999. " The Number of Rent-Seekers and Aggregate Rent-Seeking Expenditures: An Unpleasant Result," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 57-62, April.
  17. Takeshi Yamazaki, 2008. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Rent-Seeking Contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 317-327, 04.
  18. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Sad-Loser Lottery," Working Papers 204, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2008.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Roman M. Sheremeta & Subhasish M. Chowdhury, 2014. "Strategically Equivalent Contests," Working Papers 14-06, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  2. Sean P. Hargreaves Heap & Abhijit Ramalingam & Siddharth Ramalingam & Brock V. Stoddard, 2013. "Inequality and Effort: An Experiment on Competition Between Teams," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 13-08, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  3. Sheremeta, Roman, 2013. "Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments," MPRA Paper 44124, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Einy, E & Haimanko, O & Moreno, D & Sela, A & Shitovitz, B, 2013. "Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 2013-11, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  5. J. Clark, Derek & Nilssen, Tore, 2010. "Learning by Doing in Contests," Memorandum 09/2010, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  6. David Schmidt & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2005. "Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence," Caepr Working Papers 2006-004, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington, revised Aug 2006.
  7. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Lee, Dongryul & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2013. "Top guns may not fire: Best-shot group contests with group-specific public good prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 94-103.
  8. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2012. "A nested contest: Tullock meets the All-Pay Auction," MPRA Paper 41654, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 03 Sep 2012.
  9. Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Diego Moreno & Aner Sela & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2013. "Tullock Contests With Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 1303, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  10. Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Diego Moreno & A. Sela & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2013. "Tullock contests with asymmetric information," Economics Working Papers we1314, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  11. Matros, Alexander, 2012. "Sad-Loser contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 155-162.
  12. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2012. "A Nested Contest: Tullock Meets the All-pay Auction," CESifo Working Paper Series 3976, CESifo Group Munich.

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