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On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games

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Author Info
Szidarovszky, Ferenc
Okuguchi, Koji
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 18 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 135-140
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:135-140

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  1. Takeshi Yamazaki, 2009. "The uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games with risk-averse players," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 335-342, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Luis Corchón, 2007. "The theory of contests: a survey," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 69-100, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2007. "Tullock contests of weakly heterogeneous players," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 49-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Alex Dickson & Roger Hartley, 2009. "Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0911, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
  5. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2007. "All-Pay Auction Equilibria In Contests," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  6. TREICH Nicolas, 2009. "Risk-aversion and Prudence in Rent-seeking Games," Working Papers 09.05.281, LERNA, University of Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  7. Acemoglu, Daron & Jensen, Martin Kaae, 2009. "Aggregate Comparative Statics," CEPR Discussion Papers 7254, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Marco Runkel, 2006. "Optimal contest design, closeness and the contest success function," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 217-231, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2008. "Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0806, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
  10. Konrad, Kai A & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2005. "Succession Rules and Leadership Rents," CEPR Discussion Papers 5206, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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