Alex Dickson () (Keele University, Centre for Economic Research and School of Economic and Management Studies) Roger Hartley (Department of Economics, University of Manchester)
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We show in the context of a bilateral oligopoly where all agents are allowed to behave strategically the unexpected result that when the number of buyers becomes large the outcomes in a strategic market game do not converge to those at the Cournot equilibrium. However, convergence to Cournot outcomes is restored if the game is sequential: sellers move simultaneously as do buyers, but the former always move before the latter. This suggests that the ability to commit to supply decisions is an essential feature of Cournot equilibrium.
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Paper provided by Centre for Economic Research, Keele University in its series Keele Economics Research Papers with number
KERP 2007/14.
Length: 42 pages Date of creation: Oct 2007 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:kee:kerpuk:2007/14
Note: Previously University of Manchester EDP 0638. Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, University of Keele, Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG - United Kingdom Phone: +44 (0)1782 584581 Fax: +44 (0)1782 717577 Email: Web page: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/cer/ More information through EDIRC
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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