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Foreclosure in contests

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Author Info
Clark, Derek J. () (Dept. of Economics and Management, University of Tromsø)
Foros, Øystein () (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)
Sand, Jan Yngve () (Dept. of Economics and Management, University of Tromsø)

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Abstract

We consider a contest in which one firm is a favourite as it initially has a cost advantage over rivals. Instead of taking the set of rivals as given, we consider the possibility that the favourite transfers the source of its advantage wholly or partially to a subset of rival firms. The result of this may be foreclosure of those firms that do not receive the cost reduction. We present conditions under which this transfer will be expected to occur, and show that the dominant firm will prefer to grant some rivals the maximum cost reduction even if a partial transfer can be made. Furthermore we consider the welfare properties of excluding some rivals. Applications include lobbying, patent races and access to essential infrastructure.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration in its series Discussion Papers with number 2008/27.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 10 Feb 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2008_027

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Related research
Keywords: Foreclosure; contest;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior
L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "Rigging The Lobbying Process: An Application Of The All- Pay Auction," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1002, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  2. Amegashie, J Atsu, 2000. " Some Results on Rent-Seeking Contests with Shortlisting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(3-4), pages 245-53, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. J. Amegashie, 2006. "A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 135-144, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Katharine E. Rockett, 1990. "Choosing the Competition and Patent Licensing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 161-171, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gallini, Nancy T, 1984. "Deterrence by Market Sharing: A Strategic Incentive for Licensing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 931-41, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1996. " A Multi-winner Nested Rent-Seeking Contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 177-84, April.
  7. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-34, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1985. "On the Licensing of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 504-520, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Perez-Castrillo, J David & Verdier, Thierry, 1992. " A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 335-50, April.
  10. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Gradstein, Mark & Konrad, Kai A, 1999. "Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 536-45, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Amegashie, J Atsu, 1999. " The Design of Rent-Seeking Competitions: Committees, Preliminary and Final Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 63-76, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Ordover, Janusz & Shaffer, Greg, 2007. "Wholesale access in multi-firm markets: When is it profitable to supply a competitor?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1026-1045, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-89, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Sang-Seung Yi, 1998. "Whom to license patented technology," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(3), pages 189-195.
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