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On the Strategic Advantage of Interdependent Preferences in Rent-Seeking Contests

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  • Tobias Guse
  • Burkhard Hehenkamp

Abstract

We study rent-seeking contests, where the set of players contains both players with independent preferences and players with interdependent preferences. It turns out that the latter experience a strategic advantage in general two-player contests and in n-player-contests with non-increasing returns to scale technologies. Finally, we illustrate our findings for the special cases of an additively separable preference function.

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File URL: http://www.wiso.uni-dortmund.de/mik/de/content/forschung/DPSeries/PDF/03-02.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Dortmund, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 03_02.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mik:wpaper:03_02

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