This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Kockesen, L.
Ok, E.A.
Sethi, R.
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
We study the evolution of preference interdependence in aggregative games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but asymmetric with respect to player objective functions. Specifically, some players have interdependent preferences (in the sense that they care not only about their own material payoffs but also about their payoffs relative to others) while the remainder are (material) payoff maximizers in the standard sense.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number
98-19.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1998Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:98-19Contact details of provider: Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012 Phone: (212) 998-8936 Fax: (212) 995-3932 Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html More information through EDIRC
Order Information: Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012 Email:
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Anne Stubing).
Keywords: PREFERENCE CHOICES ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Rogers, Alan R, 1994.
"Evolution of Time Preference by Natural Selection ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 460-81, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996.
"The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-88, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Robson, Arthur J., 1996.
"The Evolution of Attitudes to Risk: Lottery Tickets and Relative Wealth ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 190-207, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kockesen, Levent & Ok, Efe A. & Sethi, Rajiv, 1997.
"The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences ,"
Working Papers
97-34, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Waldman, Michael, 1994.
"Systematic Errors and the Theory of Natural Selection ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 482-97, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kockesen, Levent & Ok, Efe A., 1997.
"Negatively Interdependent Preferences ,"
Working Papers
97-02, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Levent Kockesen & Efe A. Ok & Rajiv Sethi, 1997.
"On the Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences ,"
Game Theory and Information
9708001, EconWPA, revised 08 Aug 1997.
[Downloadable!]
Ok, Efe A. & Sethi, Rajiv & Kockesen, Levent, 1997.
"Interdependent Preference Formation ,"
Working Papers
97-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Bester, Helmut & Guth, Werner, 1998.
"Is altruism evolutionarily stable? ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 193-209, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Cole, Harold L & Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992.
"Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1092-1125, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992.
"Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1995.
"On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 58-81, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Ted Bergstrom, 1995.
"On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings ,"
University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series
1995A, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
[Downloadable!] Theodore C. Bergstrom, .
"On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings ,"
ELSE working papers
017, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
Ted Bergstrom, .
"On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings ,"
Papers
_023, University of Michigan, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Clark, Andrew E. & Oswald, Andrew J., 1996.
"Satisfaction and comparison income ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 359-381, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Vickers, John, 1985.
"Delegation and the Theory of the Firm ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bisin, A. & Verdier, T., 1997.
"The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences ,"
DELTA Working Papers
97-03, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
Other versions: Bolton, Gary E, 1991.
"A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1096-136, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nachbar, J H, 1990.
""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties ,"
International Journal of Game Theory ,
Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
Sethi, Rajiv, 1998.
"Strategy-Specific Barriers to Learning and Nonmonotonic Selection Dynamics ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 284-304, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cornes, Richard, 1993.
"Dyke Maintenance and Other Stories: Some Neglected Types of Public Goods ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 259-71, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Fershtman, C. & Weiss,Y., 1995.
"Social Rewards, Externalities and Stable Preferences ,"
Papers
32-95, Tel Aviv.
Other versions:
Fershtman, C. & Weiss, Y., 1996.
"Social Rewards Externalities and Stable Preferences ,"
Papers
17-96, Tel Aviv.
Fershtman, C & Weiss, Y., 1996.
"Social rewards, externalities and stable preferences ,"
Discussion Paper
28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!] Fershtman, Chaim & Weiss, Yoram, 1998.
"Social rewards, externalities and stable preferences ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 53-73, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Eshel, Ilan & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 1998.
"Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 157-79, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.) This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page .
Access and
download statistics Did you know? IDEAS also computes impact factors for journals and working paper series.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .