We study the evolution of preference interdependence in aggregative games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but asymmetric with respect to player objective functions. Specifically, some players have interdependent preferences (in the sense that they care not only about their own material payoffs but also about their payoffs relative to others) while the remainder are (material) payoff maximizers in the standard sense.
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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number
98-19.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
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Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2004.
"What to Maximize if You Must,"
Discussion Papers
1414, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2005.
"The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences,"
Discussion Papers
1415, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]