Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Market design with endogenous preferences

Contents:

Author Info

  • Heifetz, Aviad
  • Segev, Ella
  • Talley, Eric
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    No abstract is available for this item.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4J4HKBK-2/2/99f3432f655c1c9d8e28975f296f7c27
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 58 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 121-153

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:58:y:2007:i:1:p:121-153

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Kockesen, Levent & Ok, Efe A. & Sethi, Rajiv, 2000. "Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 303-310, May.
    2. Bar-Gill, O. & Fershtman, C., 2001. "The Limit of Public Policy: Endogenous Preferences," Papers, Tel Aviv 2001-5, Tel Aviv.
    3. Becker, Gary S, 1976. "Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 817-26, September.
    4. Peter Cramton & Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer, 1985. "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently," Working papers 406, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    5. Benos, Alexandros V., 1998. "Aggressiveness and survival of overconfident traders," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 353-383, September.
    6. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1421R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2004.
    7. Horowitz, John K. & McConnell, Kenneth E., 2002. "A Review of WTA/WTP Studies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 426-447, November.
    8. Possajennikov, Alex, 2000. "On the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 125-129, May.
    9. Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Introduction to the Evolution of Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 225-230, April.
    10. Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, 1999. "Preference Evolution and Reciprocity," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9903001, EconWPA, revised 12 Mar 1999.
    11. Kockesen, Levent & Ok, Efe A. & Sethi, Rajiv, 2000. "The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 274-299, June.
    12. Chaim Fershtman & Aviad Heifetz, 2006. "Read My Lips, Watch for Leaps: Preference Equilibrium and Political Instability," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 246-265, 01.
    13. Huck, Steffen & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999. "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 13-24, July.
    14. Guttman, Joel M., 2000. "On the evolutionary stability of preferences for reciprocity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 31-50, March.
    15. Arlen, Jennifer & Spitzer, Matthew & Talley, Eric, 2002. "Endowment Effects within Corporate Agency Relationships," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 1-37, January.
    16. Kyle, Albert S & Wang, F Albert, 1997. " Speculation Duopoly with Agreement to Disagree: Can Overconfidence Survive the Market Test?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 52(5), pages 2073-90, December.
    17. Huck, Steffen & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Oechssler, Jörg, 1997. "Learning to like what you have: Explaining the endowment effect," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1997,38, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    18. Matthew Rabin., 1997. "Psychology and Economics," Economics Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley 97-251, University of California at Berkeley.
    19. Heifetz, Aviad & Segev, Ella, 2004. "The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 117-134, October.
    20. Fershtman, C. & Weiss,Y., 1995. "Social Rewards, Externalities and Stable Preferences," Papers, Tel Aviv 32-95, Tel Aviv.
    21. Nabil Al-Najjar & Sandeep Baliga & David Besanko, 2005. "The Sunk Cost Bias and Managerial Pricing Practices," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000496, UCLA Department of Economics.
    22. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    23. Rotemberg, Julio J, 1994. "Human Relations in the Workplace," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 684-717, August.
    24. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2012. "Mechanism Design and Intentions," Working Paper Series in Economics, University of Cologne, Department of Economics 53, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 21 Aug 2012.
    2. Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polanía Reyes, 2009. "Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: A Preference-based Lucas Critique of Public Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 2734, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2011. "Economic incentives and social preferences: substitutes or complements?," Department of Economics University of Siena, Department of Economics, University of Siena 617, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    4. Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polanía Reyes, 2009. "Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: A preference-Based Lucas Critique of Public Policy," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics 2009-11, .

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:58:y:2007:i:1:p:121-153. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.