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Read My Lips, Watch for Leaps: Preference Equilibrium and Political Instability

Author

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  • Chaim Fershtman
  • Aviad Heifetz

Abstract

As norms and tastes adapt to the social conditions shaped by policy variables, voters' opinions about these policies may evolve as well. We show how this process can lead to political instability. Moreover, if a politician's platform is shaped opportunistically so as to gain the majority's support, once in office the politician should not implement the promised policy in order to remain popular and get re-elected. Rather, the effective policy in this respect is the one which will be deemed optimal by most voters after the norms and opinions will adjust to that very policy. Copyright 2006 Royal Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Chaim Fershtman & Aviad Heifetz, 2006. "Read My Lips, Watch for Leaps: Preference Equilibrium and Political Instability," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 246-265, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:116:y:2006:i:508:p:246-265
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    Cited by:

    1. Wu, Jiabin, 2017. "Political institutions and the evolution of character traits," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 260-276.
    2. Francesco Giovannoni & Daniel Seidmann, 2014. "Corruption and power in democracies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(3), pages 707-734, March.
    3. Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2011. "Economic incentives and social preferences: substitutes or complements?," Department of Economics University of Siena 617, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    4. Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2012. "Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 50(2), pages 368-425, June.
    5. Wu, Jiabin, 2016. "Political Institutions and Preference Evolution," MPRA Paper 69597, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Heifetz, Aviad & Segev, Ella & Talley, Eric, 2007. "Market design with endogenous preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 121-153, January.
    7. Eyal Winter & Ignacio Garcia-Jurado & Jose Mendez-Naya & Luciano Mendez-Naya, 2009. "Mental Equilibrium and Rational Emotions," Discussion Paper Series dp521, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    8. Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polanía Reyes, 2009. "Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: A preference-Based Lucas Critique of Public Policy," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2009-11, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    9. Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polanía Reyes, 2009. "Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: A Preference-based Lucas Critique of Public Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 2734, CESifo.

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