The Limit of Public Policy: Endogenous Preferences
AbstractIn designing public policy it is not enough to consider the possible reaction of individuals to the chosen policy. Public policy may also affect the formation of preferences and norms in a society. The endogenous evolution of preferences, in addition to introducing a conceptual difficulty in evaluating policies, may also eventually affect actual behavior. In order to demonstrate the implications of endogenous preferences on the design of optimal public policy, we present a model in which a subsidy policy is set to encourage contributions towards a public good.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number 2001-5.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/foerder.asp
More information through EDIRC
PUBLIC POLICY ; BEHAVIOUR ; PUBLIC GOODS;
Other versions of this item:
- Bar-Gill, O. & Fershtman, C., 2000. "The Limit of Public Policy: Endogenous Preferences," Discussion Paper 2000-71, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- P5 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems
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