Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games
AbstractWe study the evolution of preference interdependence in aggregative games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but asymmetric with respect to player objective functions. Specifically, some players have interdependent preferences (in the sense that they care not only about their own material payoffs but also about their payoffs relative to others) while the remainder are (material) payoff maximizers in the standard sense.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 31 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- Kockesen, L. & Ok, E.A. & Sethi, R., 1998. "Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games," Working Papers 98-19, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
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