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The Economics of Cultural Formation of Preferences

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  • Michael M. Pichler

    (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

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    Abstract

    This paper introduces a generalized representation of the formation of continuous preferences (which can reflect different intensities). The preference intensity that a child adopts is formed as the collective outcome of all role models for preference intensities - which are derived from the socioeconomic actions of adults - that it socially learns from. We then show how the adopted preference intensities induce preferences over socioeconomic choices. Finally, this cultural formation of preferences process is endogenized as resulting out of optimal parental socialization decisions. This framework thus endogenously determines the intergenerational evolution of preference intensities and the induced preferences.

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    File URL: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-431.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2010
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 431.

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    Length: 33 pages
    Date of creation: Apr 2010
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:431

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    Postal: Postfach 10 01 31, 33501 Bielefeld
    Phone: +49(0)521-106-4907
    Web page: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/
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    Related research

    Keywords: Socialization; Preference Evolution; Endogenous Preferences; Cultural transmission;

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    References

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    1. Alberto Bisin & Giorgio Topa & Thierry Verdier, 2009. "Cultural transmission, socialization and the population dynamics of multiple-trait distributions," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 5(1), pages 139-154.
    2. Rath, Kali P, 1992. "A Direct Proof of the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 427-33, July.
    3. Galor, Oded & Moav, Omer, 2001. "Natural Selection and the Origin of Economic Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 2727, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Fershtman, C. & Weiss, Y., 1996. "Social Rewards Externalities and Stable Preferences," Papers 17-96, Tel Aviv.
    5. Bester, Helmut & Guth, Werner, 1998. "Is altruism evolutionarily stable?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 193-209, February.
    6. Olcina, Gonzalo & Penarrubia, Concepcion, 2004. "Hold up and intergenerational transmission of preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 111-132, May.
    7. Jan K. Brueckner & Oleg Smirnov, 2004. "Workings of the Melting Pot: Social Networks and the Evolution of Population Attributes," CESifo Working Paper Series 1320, CESifo Group Munich.
    8. Bisin, A. & Verdier, T., 1999. "A Model of Cultural Transmission, Voting and Political Ideology," Papers 1999-13, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.
    9. Hauk, Esther & Sáez-Martí, María, 2001. "On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption," Working Paper Series 564, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    10. Bruce Sacerdote, 2007. "How Large Are the Effects from Changes in Family Environment? A Study of Korean American Adoptees," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(1), pages 119-157, 02.
    11. Bisin, A. & Verdier, T., 1997. "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences," DELTA Working Papers 97-03, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    12. Pollak, Robert A, 1976. "Interdependent Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 309-20, June.
    13. Luisa Escriche & Gonzalo Olcina & Rosario Sánchez, 2004. "Gender discrimination and intergenerational transmission of preferences," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(3), pages 485-511, July.
    14. Jan K. Brueckner & Oleg Smirnov, 2008. "Social Networks And The Convergence Of Population Attributes: A Generalization," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 359-365.
    15. Zwiebel, Jeffrey H. & Vayanos, Dimitri & DeMarzo, Peter M., 2001. "Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Uni-Dimensional Opinions," Research Papers 1719, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    16. Kockesen, Levent & Ok, Efe A. & Sethi, Rajiv, 2000. "The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 274-299, June.
    17. Bisin, A. & Verdier, T., 1997. "On the Cultural Transmission of Preferences for Social Status," DELTA Working Papers 97-04, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    18. Bruce Sacerdote, 2002. "The Nature and Nurture of Economic Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 344-348, May.
    19. Mozaffar Qizilbash, 2009. "Well-Being, Preference Formation and the Danger of Paternalism," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2009-18, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group.
    20. Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
    21. Alberto Bisin & Giorgio Topa, 2003. "Empirical Models of Cultural Transmission," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 363-375, 04/05.
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    Cited by:
    1. Cerqueti, Roy & Correani, Luca & Garofalo, Giuseppe, 2013. "Economic interactions and social tolerance: A dynamic perspective," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 458-463.
    2. Alberto Bisin & Thierry Verdier, 2010. "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and Socialization," NBER Working Papers 16512, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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