On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption
AbstractWe provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of values. We show that under reasonable parameters the economy has two steady states which differ in their levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium se1ection process is the education effort exerted by parents which depends on the initial distribution of ethics in the population and on expectations about policies in the future. We propose sorne policy interventions which via parents' efforts have long lasting effects on corruption and show the success of intensive education campaigns. We argue that our model exp1ains the differecnes which are observed across countries with similar degrees of economic development and that educating the young is a key element in reducing corruption successfully.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 107 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Other versions of this item:
- Hauk, Esther & Sáez Martí, María, . "On the cultural transmission of corruption," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/4143, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Hauk, Esther & Sáez-Martí, María, 2001. "On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption," Working Paper Series 564, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Esther Hauk & Maria Sáez, 1999. "On the cultural transmission of corruption," Economics Working Papers 392, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics
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