On the evolutionary stability of preferences for reciprocity

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On the evolutionary stability of preferences for reciprocity

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Guttman, Joel M.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 16 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 31-50
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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:16:y:2000:i:1:p:31-50

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Thomas Norman, 2004. "Dynamically Stable Preferences," Economics Series Working Papers 207, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
James Cox & Klarita Sadiraj & Vjollca Sadiraj, 2008. "Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 1-24, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Aviad Heifetz & Ella Segev & Eric Talley, . "Market Design with Endogenous Preferences," University of Southern California Legal Working Paper Series usclwps-1001, University of Southern California Law School. [Downloadable!]
Umut Ones & Louis Putterman, 2004. "The Ecology of Collective Action: A Public Goods and Sanctions Experiment with Controlled Group Formation," Working Papers 2004-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ones, Umut & Putterman, Louis, 2007. "The ecology of collective action: A public goods and sanctions experiment with controlled group formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 495-521, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Anders Poulsen & Gert Svendsen, 2005. "Social Capital and Endogenous Preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 171-196, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cox, J. & Friedman, D. & Gjerstad, S., 2006. "A Trackable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1181, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- James C. Cox & Daniel Friedman & Steven Gjerstad, 2006. "A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2006-05, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
- James Cox & Daniel Friedman & Steven Gjerstad, 2004. "A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness," Experimental 0406001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Cox, James C. & Friedman, Daniel & Gjerstad, Steven, 2007. "A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-45, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
HEIFETZ, Aviad & SHANNON, Chris & SPIEGEL, Yossi, 2003. "What to maximize if you must," CORE Discussion Papers 2003047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2002. "What to Maximize If You Must," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1052, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2003. "What to Maximize If You Must," Game Theory and Information 0303002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2004. "What to Maximize if You Must," Discussion Papers 1414, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
- Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2002. "What to Maximize if You Must," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000063, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Chris Shannon, 2003. "What to Maximize if You Must," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000044, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Heifetz, Aviad & Shannon, Chris & Spiegel, Yossi, 2007. "What to maximize if you must," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 31-57, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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