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Evolution in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma

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  • Nachbar, John H.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 19 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 307-326

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:19:y:1992:i:3:p:307-326

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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Cited by:
  1. Guttman, Joel M., 1996. "Rational actors, tit-for-tat types, and the evolution of cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 27-56, January.
  2. Maarten C.W. Janssen, 2000. "Imitation of Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Games with Some Local Interaction," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-019/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  3. Robert Hoffmann, 2001. "The Ecology of Cooperation," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 101-118, March.
  4. repec:dgr:uvatin:2000019 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Lindgren, Kristian & Verendel, Vilhelm, 2013. "Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma--The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play," MPRA Paper 43662, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Kristian Lindgren & Vilhelm Verendel, 2013. "Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma—The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 1-20, January.
  7. Conlon, John R., 2003. "Hope springs eternal: learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 35-65, September.
  8. Guttman, Joel M., 2000. "On the evolutionary stability of preferences for reciprocity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 31-50, March.
  9. Robert Hoffmann, 1999. "The Independent Localisations of Interaction and Learning in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 57-72, August.

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