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Procedural Fairness in Economic and Social Choice: Evidence from a Survey of Voters

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  • Paul Anand

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University)

Abstract

The paper argues for the relevance of procedural justice to social choice and presents supporting evidence from primary data on voter attitudes. A preliminary section proposes and discusses five propositions that indicate the potential value and significance of processes for social choice. Section 3 considers evidence for what psychologists have called 'voice' and the extent to which control over, or representation in, a decision is compatible with other economic notions of fair process, like random choosing. Section 4 examines empirical evidence that sensitivity to process fairness may be a means of dealing with power inequalities between interacting agents. Section 5 goes on to examine evidence concerning treatment which in some way is threatening to a person's position as an agent. A brief concluding section summarizes and indicates avenues for future research.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The Open University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics in its series Open Discussion Papers in Economics with number 27.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2000
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 247-270, April
Handle: RePEc:opn:wpaper:27

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Keywords: procedural fairness; empirical social choice; random choosing; regard; cheap talk;

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References

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  1. Anand, Paul, 1991. "The Nature of Rational Choice and The Foundations of Statistics," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(2), pages 199-216, April.
  2. Eichberger, J. & Kelsey, D., 1995. "Uncertainty Aversion and Preferences for Randomisation," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 476, The University of Melbourne.
  3. James Konow, 2001. "A Positive Theory of Economic Fairness," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000138, David K. Levine.
  4. Georg Kirchsteiger & Ernst Fehr & Arno Riedl, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5927, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  5. Frank, Robert H, 1987. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 593-604, September.
  6. Machina, Mark J, 1989. "Dynamic Consistency and Non-expected Utility Models of Choice under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 1622-68, December.
  7. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 728-41, September.
  8. Belk, Russell W & Coon, Gregory S, 1993. " Gift Giving as Agapic Love: An Alternative to the Exchange Paradigm Based on Dating Experiences," Journal of Consumer Research, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(3), pages 393-417, December.
  9. Atkinson, Anthony B, 1999. " The Contributions of Amartya Sen to Welfare Economics," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 101(2), pages 173-90, June.
  10. Matthew Rabin., 1992. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Economics Working Papers 92-199, University of California at Berkeley.
  11. Pillutla, Madan M. & Murnighan, J. Keith, 1996. "Unfairness, Anger, and Spite: Emotional Rejections of Ultimatum Offers," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 208-224, December.
  12. W. Guth & R. Schmittberger & B. Schwartz, 2010. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 291, David K. Levine.
  13. Sen, Amartya K, 1979. "Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(355), pages 537-58, September.
  14. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
  15. Varian, Hal R., 1976. "On the history of concepts of fairness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 486-487, December.
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