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The Nature of Rational Choice and The Foundations of Statistics

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  • Anand, Paul

Abstract

This paper addresses the claim that L. J. Savage's account of subjective utility theory models beliefs for all rational agents. Proposals for a two-dimensional model of belief are discussed and sources of criticism of subjective utility theory as a theory of rational choice are categorized. A theory of rational choice is proposed that gives conditions under which choices (including those made by "uncertainty" averters) can be judged to be rational. The paper corroborates A. K. Sen's findings, which show that rationality is not a behavioral entity. Copyright 1991 by Royal Economic Society.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 43 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 199-216

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Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:43:y:1991:i:2:p:199-216

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Cited by:
  1. Paul Anand, 2000. "Procedural Fairness in Economic and Social Choice: Evidence from a Survey of Voters," Open Discussion Papers in Economics, The Open University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics 27, The Open University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
  2. Marcello Basili & Carlo Zappia, 2010. "Ambiguity and uncertainty in Ellsberg and Shackle," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(3), pages 449-474.
  3. Alberto Feduzi, 2005. "On the relationship between keynes´s conception of evidential weight and the ellsberg paradox," Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre', Department of Economics - University Roma Tre 0051, Department of Economics - University Roma Tre.
  4. Marcello Basili & Carlo Zappia, 2007. "The weight of argument and non-additive measures: a note," Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) University of Siena, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena 003, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena.
  5. Basili, Marcello & Zappia, Carlo, 2009. "Keynes's "non-numerical" probabilities and non-additive measures," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 419-430, June.

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