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Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups

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Author Info
Daniel Friedman (University of California, Santa Cruz)
Nirvikar Singh (University of California, Santa Cruz)

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Abstract

We discuss how small group interactions overcome evolutionary problems that might otherwise erode vengefulness as a preference trait. The basic viability problem is that the fitness benefits of vengeance often do not cover its personal cost. Even when a sufficiently high level of vengefulness brings increased fitness, at lower levels, vengefulness has a negative fitness gradient. This leads to the threshold problem: how can vengefulness become established in the first place? If it somehow becomes established at a high level, vengefulness creates an attractive niche for cheap imitators, those who look like highly vengeful types but do not bear the costs. This is the mimicry problem, and unchecked it could eliminate vengeful traits. We show how within-group social norms can solve these problems even when encounters with outsiders are also important.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0412005.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 08 Dec 2004
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0412005

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 35
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C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2007. "Equilibrium Vengeance," MPRA Paper 4321, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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