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The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R Is Greater Than 2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates

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Author Info
 Baye, Michael R
Kovenock, Dan
de Vries, Casper G

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Abstract

In G. Tullock's rent-seeking model, the probability that a player wins the game depends on expenditures raised to the power R. The authors show that a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exists when R "is greater than" 2, and that overdissipation of rents does not arise in any Nash equilibrium. The authors derive a tight bound on the level of rent dissipation that arises in a symmetric equilibrium when the strategy space is discrete and show that full rent dissipation occurs when the strategy space is continuous. The authors' results are shown to be consistent with recent experimental evidence on the dissipation of rents. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 81 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (December)
Pages: 363-80
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:81:y:1994:i:3-4:p:363-80

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  1. Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Mueller, Wieland, 2000. "Merger in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Felix Várdy & John Morgan, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Public Economics 0504005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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