This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Crowding-out in Productive and Redistributive Rent-Seeking

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci
Eric Langlais
Bruno Lovat
Francesco Parisi

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their pro- ductivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent- seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors' exit option, distinguishing between "redistributive rent-seeking"and "productive rent-seeking" situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the "lost treasure" effect), since valuable rents are left unex- ploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors' exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://cournot2.u-strasbg.fr/users/beta/publications/2007/2007-02.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of BETA with number 2007-02.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2007-02

Contact details of provider:
Postal: PEGE. 61, Aven. de la For�t-Noire 67000 Strasbourg
Phone: +33 3 90 24 20 69
Fax: +33 3 90 24 20 71
Email:
Web page: http://cournot2.u-strasbg.fr/users/beta/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: Rent-seeking; rent dissipation; Tullock' s paradox.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when r>2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1039, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  2. Appelbaum, Elie & Katz, Eliakim, 1986. "Rent seeking and entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 207-212. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Stephen Coate, 2004. "Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 772-804, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Demsetz, Harold, 1976. "Economics as a Guide to Antitrust Regulation," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 371-84, August.
  5. Rowley, Charles K, 1991. " Gordon Tullock: Entrepreneur of Public Choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 149-69, September.
  6. Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1999. " The Incidence of Overdissipation in Rent-Seeking Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(3-4), pages 439-54, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Perez-Castrillo, J David & Verdier, Thierry, 1992. " A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 335-50, April.
  8. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Amegashie, J Atsu, 1999. " The Number of Rent-Seekers and Aggregate Rent-Seeking Expenditures: An Unpleasant Result," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 57-62, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-27, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Meixing DAI, 2007. "A two-pillar strategy to keep inflation expectations at bay: A basic theoretical framework," Working Papers of BETA 2007-20, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
  2. Meixing DAI & Moïse SIDIROPOULOS & Eleftherios SPYROMITROS, 2007. "La transparence de la politique monétaire et la dynamique des marchés financiers," Working Papers of BETA 2007-19, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
  3. Estelle Dhont-Peltrault & Etienne Pfister, 2007. "R&D cooperation versus R&D subcontracting: empirical evidence from French survey data," Working Papers of BETA 2007-17, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
  4. Gisèle Umbhauer, 2007. "De l’amiante au chrysotile, un glissement stratégique dans la désinformation," Working Papers of BETA 2007-15, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
  5. Sofia Pessoa e Costa & Stéphane Robin, 2007. "The Impact Of Training Programmes On Wages In France: An Evaluation Of The “Qualifying Contract” Using Propensity Scores," Working Papers of BETA 2007-18, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
  6. Li Qin & Eleftherios Spyromitros & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2007. "Monetary Policy with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences for Robustness," Working Papers of BETA 2007-23, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? It is the publishers that input data about their publications, as there is no staff at RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-9.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.