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The Incidence of Overdissipation in Rent-Seeking Contests

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Author Info
 Baye, Michael R
Kovenock, Dan
de Vries, Casper G

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Abstract

Gordon Tullock's analysis of rent seeking and overdissipation is reconsidered. The authors show that, while equilibrium strategies do not permit overdissipation in expectation, for particular realizations of players' mixed strategies the total amount spent competing for rents can exceed the value of the prize. They also show that the cross-sectional incidence of overdissipation in the perfectly discriminating contest ranges from 0.50 to 0.44 as the number of players increases from two to infinity. Thus, even though the original analysis of overdissipation is flawed, there are instances in which rentseekers spend more than the prize is worth. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 99 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (June)
Pages: 439-54
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:99:y:1999:i:3-4:p:439-54

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  1. Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan & Mordechai Schwarz, 2008. "Efforts in two-sided contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 283-291, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2006. "Multi-battle contests," Discussion Papers 122, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Frederik Schmidt, 2009. "Evolutionary stability of altruism and envy in Tullock contests," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 247-259, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Giuseppe, Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno, Lovat & Eric, Langlais & Francesco, Parisi, 2004. "Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent seeking," MPRA Paper 1151, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Nov 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. repec:att:wimass:1919986 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Cotton, Christopher, 2007. "Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access," MPRA Paper 1842, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, 2005. "Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Rethinking Tullock's paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 411-422, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Alexander Matros & Wooyoung Lim, 2007. "Contests with a Stochastic Number of Players," Working Papers 323, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2008. [Downloadable!]
  9. Christopher J. Ellis & John Fender, 2007. "Public Sector Capital and the Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy," Discussion Papers 07-14, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. [Downloadable!]
  10. Lugovskyy, Volodymyr & Puzzello, Daniela & Tucker, Steven, 2008. "An experimental investigation of overdissipation in the all pay auction," MPRA Paper 8604, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  11. Robinson, W.T. & Min, S., 1998. "Is the First to Market the First to fail?: Empirical Evidence for Manufacturing Business," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1115, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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