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A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games

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Author Info
 Perez-Castrillo, J David
Verdier, Thierry

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Abstract

In this paper, the authors reconsider the basic model of "efficient rent-seeking." They stress the importance of the shape of the players' reaction curve in order to understand the impact of the technology of rent-seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game. The authors give a complete characterization of the pure strategy equilibria. Moreover, the possibility of preemption by a Stakelberg leader is discussed according to the nature of the technology of rent-seeking available to the agents. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 73 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Pages: 335-50
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:73:y:1992:i:3:p:335-50

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  1. Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2006. "Biased Contests," Working Papers 06.21, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    • Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2008. "Biased contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 55-67, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002. "Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/22, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Burkhard Hehenkamp, 2006. "The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action-monotonic games," Discussion Papers in Economics 05_05, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Giuseppe, Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno, Lovat & Eric, Langlais & Francesco, Parisi, 2004. "Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent seeking," MPRA Paper 1151, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Nov 2006. [Downloadable!]
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  5. TREICH Nicolas, 2009. "Risk-aversion and Prudence in Rent-seeking Games," Working Papers 09.05.281, LERNA, University of Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  6. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2005. "Heterogenous Groups and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2005.16, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1. [Downloadable!]
  7. Farhad Nili & Gabriel Talmain, . "Rent-seeking, Occupational Choice and Oil Boom," Discussion Papers 01/11, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
  8. T. Guse & B. Hehenkamp, 2006. "The strategic advantage of interdependent preferences in rent-seeking contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 323-352, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Takeshi Yamazaki, 2009. "The uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games with risk-averse players," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 335-342, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, 2005. "Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Rethinking Tullock's paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 411-422, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Riechmann, Thomas, 2002. "Relative Payoffs and Evolutionary Spite. Evolutionary Equilibria in Games with Finitely Many Players," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Hannover dp-260, Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
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  12. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2007. "Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 101-124, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Luis Corchón, 2007. "The theory of contests: a survey," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 69-100, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2007. "Tullock contests of weakly heterogeneous players," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 49-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Clark, Derek J. & Foros, Øystein & Sand, Jan Yngve, 2009. "Foreclosure in contests," Discussion Papers 2008/27, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  16. Tobias Guse & Burkhard Hehenkamp, 2004. "On the Strategic Advantage of Interdependent Preferences in Rent-Seeking Contests," Discussion Papers in Economics 03_02, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  17. Pavlo Blavatskyy, . "Why the Olympics have three prizes and not just one," IEW - Working Papers iewwp200, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  18. Luis C. Corchon, 2004. "Forms Of Governance And The Size Of Rent-Seeking," Economics Working Papers we041905, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
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  19. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2007. "All-Pay Auction Equilibria In Contests," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
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