Tullock's rent-seeking contest with a minimum expenditure requirement
AbstractWe consider a rent-seeking contest of the kind introduced by Tullock (1980) in which two players compete for a monopoly rent. We extend the contest by requiring that if a player puts forward an effort, his expenditures must be larger than or equal to some minimum level. We show that, depending on the model parameters, the number of Nash equilibria of the extended model can be zero, one, two or four. Furthermore, it turns out that the extent of rent dissipation in a Nash equilibrium of the extended model can be larger than, equal to, or smaller than the extent of rent dissipation in the unique Nash equilibrium of the original model. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 93 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Other versions of this item:
- Schoonbeek, Lambert & Kooreman, Peter, 1997. " Tullock's Rent-Seeking Contest with a Minimum Expenditure Requirement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 477-86, December.
- Schoonbeek, L. & Kooreman, P., 1997. "Tullock's rent-seeking contest with a minimum expenditure requirement," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-377557, Tilburg University.
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- ISKAKOV, Mikhail & ISKAKOV, Alexey & ZAKHAROV, Alexey, 2014. "Equilibria in secure strategies in the Tullock contest," CORE Discussion Papers 2014010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2007.
"Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking,"
Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 199-229, October.
- Giuseppe, Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno, Lovat & Eric, Langlais & Francesco, Parisi, 2004. "Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent seeking," MPRA Paper 1151, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Nov 2006.
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2007. "Crowding-out in Productive and Redistributive Rent-Seeking," Working Papers of BETA 2007-02, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Münster, Johannes, 2006. "Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: comment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 119, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Johannes Münster, 2007. "Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 329-335, March.
- Hironori Otsubo, 2013. "Do campaign spending limits diminish competition? An experiment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(3), pages 2223-2234.
- HHironori Otsubo, 2012. "Contests with Incumbency Advantages: An Experiment Investigation of the Effect of Limits on Spending Behavior and Outcome," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-020, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
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