Relative standing comparisons, risk taking, and safety regulations
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.
Volume (Year): 51 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- repec:str:wpaper:0001 is not listed on IDEAS
- Koenig, Tobias & Lausen, Tobias, 2013. "Relative Consumption, Optimal Taxation and Public Provision of Private Goods," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen FakultÃ¤t der Leibniz UniversitÃ¤t Hannover dp-510, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
- Salamon, Peter & Komlos, John, 2005.
"The Poverty of Growth with Interdependent Utility Functions,"
Discussion Papers in Economics
619, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Komlos, John & Salamon, Peter, 2008. "The poverty of growth with interdependent utility functions," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2242-2247, December.
- John Komlos & Peter Salamon, 2005. "The Poverty of Growth with Interdependent Utility Functions," CESifo Working Paper Series 1470, CESifo Group Munich.
- Colin Jennings & Hein Roelfsema, 2008.
"Civil Conflict, Federalism and Strategic Delegation of Leadership,"
Journal of Peace Research,
Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 45(4), pages 557-573, July.
- Colin Jennings & Hein Roelfsema, 2008. "Civil Conflict, Federalism and Strategic Delegation of Leadership," Working Papers 0803, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
- Jennings, Colin & Roelfsema, Hein, 2008. "Civil conflict, federalism and strategic delegation of leadership," SIRE Discussion Papers 2008-16, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Reiter, Michael, 2000. "Relative preferences and public goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 565-585, March.
- Harriger, Jessica & Khanna, Neha & Pape, Andreas, 2010. "Conspicuous Consumption and Inequality," MPRA Paper 24910, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ireland, N. J., 2001. "Optimal income tax in the presence of status effects," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 193-212, August.
- Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013.
"Status concerns as a motive for crime?,"
DICE Discussion Papers
93, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- T. Guse & B. Hehenkamp, 2006. "The strategic advantage of interdependent preferences in rent-seeking contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 323-352, December.
- Tim Friehe & Mario Mechtel, 2013. "Gambling to Leapfrog in Status?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4174, CESifo Group Munich.
- Alessandro Balestrino, 2012. "Taxes, Status Goods, and Piracy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3704, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ireland, Norman J., 1998. "Status-seeking, income taxation and efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 99-113, October.
- Brown, Gordon D. A. & Gardner, Jonathan & Oswald, Andrew J. & Qian, Jing, 2005. "Does Wage Rank Affect Employees' Wellbeing?," IZA Discussion Papers 1505, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.