Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict
AbstractWe study conflict between two groups of individuals. Using Schaffer`s (1988) concept of evolutionary stability we provide an evolutionary underpinning for in-group altruism combined with spiteful behavior towards members of the rival out-group. We characterize the set of evolutionarily stable combinations of in-group favoritism and out-group spite and find that an increase in in-group altruism can be balanced by a decrease in spiteful behavior towards the out-group.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Munich Reprints in Economics with number 13963.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology 306(2012): pp. 61-67
altruism; spite; in-group favoritism; conflict; evolutionary stability; indirect evolutionary approach;
Other versions of this item:
- Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2011. "Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict," Working Papers evolutionarily_stable, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- NEP-ALL-2013-04-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2013-04-06 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-04-06 (Game Theory)
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