Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Jay Pil Choi & Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Jaesoo Kim, 2016. "Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 118(4), pages 816-840, October.
- Jay Pil Choi & Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Jaesoo Kim, 2014. "Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry," CESifo Working Paper Series 5137, CESifo.
References listed on IDEAS
- Dasgupta, Indraneel, 2009.
"'Living' wage, class conflict and ethnic strife,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 750-765, November.
- Dasgupta, Indraneel, 2008. "‘Living’ Wage, Class Conflict and Ethnic Strife," IZA Discussion Papers 3631, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Indraneel Dasgupta, 2008. "‘Living’ wage, class conflict and ethnic strife," Discussion Papers 08/08, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
- Indraneel Dasgupta, 2009. "'Living' wage, class conflict and ethnic strife," Post-Print hal-00722792, HAL.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2009.
"The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 84-86, May.
- Kovenock, Dan & Konrad, Kai A., 2008. "The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 6741, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2008. "The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1209, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2008. "The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints [Die Rolle von Kapazitätsgrenzen für die Vorteilhaftigkeit von Allianzen]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-07, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2009. "The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints," Munich Reprints in Economics 22083, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603, Decembrie.
- Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Lee, Dongryul & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2013.
"Top guns may not fire: Best-shot group contests with group-specific public good prizes,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 94-103.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2011. "Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 024, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Chowdhury, Subhasish & Lee, Dongryul & Sheremeta, Roman, 2013. "Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes," MPRA Paper 46654, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2013. "Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes," Working Papers 13-12, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Glazer, Amihai, 2002.
"Allies as rivals: internal and external rent seeking,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 155-162, June.
- Glazer, A., 1999. "Allies as Rivals: Internal and External Rent Seeking," Papers 99-00-10, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- William E. Stein & Amnon Rapoport, 2004. "Asymmetric Two-Stage Group Rent-Seeking: Comparison of Two Contest Structures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(1_2), pages 151-167, January.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Attack-and-Defence Group Contests," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 049, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg & Iryna Topolyan, 2014. "The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 603-640, November.
- Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
- Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
- Kolmar, Martin & Rommeswinkel, Hendrik, 2013. "Contests with group-specific public goods and complementarities in efforts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 9-22.
- Stergios Skaperdas, 1996.
"Contest success functions (*),"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290, February.
- Kyung Baik, 2008. "Contests with group-specific public-good prizes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(1), pages 103-117, January.
- Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-1534, November.
- Thomas Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, 1983.
"A strategic calculus of voting,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 7-53, January.
- Thomas R Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, 2001. "A Strategic Calculus of Voting," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000039, David K. Levine.
- Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler, 2001. "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 869-896, September.
- Warneryd, Karl, 2001. "Replicating contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 323-327, June.
- Muller, Holger M & Warneryd, Karl, 2001. "Inside versus Outside Ownership: A Political Theory of the Firm," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 527-541, Autumn.
- Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. "Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
- Baik, Kyung Hwan & Lee, Sanghack, 2000. "Two-Stage Rent-Seeking Contests with Carryovers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 285-296, June.
- Scully, Gerald W., 1995. "The Market Structure of Sports," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226743950, September.
- Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 2001.
"Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox,"
American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(3), pages 663-672, September.
- Esteban, J. & Ray, D., 1999. "Collective Action and Group Size Paradox," Papers 23, El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza.
- Baik, Kyung Hwan, 1993. "Effort levels in contests : The public-good prize case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 363-367.
- Emerson M. S. Niou & Guofu Tan, 2005. "External Threat and Collective Action," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(3), pages 519-530, July.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1983. "From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 371-386, January.
- Lee, Dongryul, 2012. "Weakest-link contests with group-specific public good prizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 238-248.
- Mark Gradstein, 1995. "Intensity Of Competition, Entry And Entry Deterrence In Rent Seeking Contests," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 79-91, March.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2015. "The Group All-Pay Auction with Heterogeneous Impact Functions," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 069, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Katz, Eliakim & Tokatlidu, Julia, 1996. "Group competition for rents," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 599-607, December.
- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Aditya Bhan & Tarun Kabiraj, 2020. "Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation and Terror Activity," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(6), pages 1085-1106, December.
- Martin Kolmar & Hendrik Rommeswinkel, 2020. "Group size and group success in conflicts," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(4), pages 777-822, December.
- Indraneel Dasgupta & Ranajoy Guha Neogi, 2018.
"Between-group contests over group-specific public goods with within-group fragmentation,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(3), pages 315-334, March.
- Dasgupta, Indraneel & Neogi, Ranajoy Guha, 2017. "Between-Group Contests over Group-Specific Public Goods with Within-Group Fragmentation," IZA Discussion Papers 10881, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Konishi, Hideo & Pan, Chen-Yu, 2021.
"Endogenous alliances in survival contests,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 337-358.
- Hideo Konishi & Chen-Yu Pan, 2019. "Endogenous Alliances in Survival Contests," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 974, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 06 Mar 2021.
- Barbieri, Stefano & Malueg, David A., 2016. "Private-information group contests: Best-shot competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 219-234.
- Bakshi, Dripto & Dasgupta, Indraneel, 2021. "Internal versus External Rent-Seeking with In-Group Inequality and Public Good Provision," IZA Discussion Papers 14871, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Stefano Barbieri, 2023. "Complementarity and information in collective action," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(1), pages 167-206, January.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Anwesha Mukherjee & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2021.
"In-group versus Out-group Preferences in Intergroup Conflict: An Experiment,"
Working Papers
21-02, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Chowdhury, Subhasish & Mukherjee, Anwesha & Sheremeta, Roman, 2021. "In-group versus Out-group Preferences in Intergroup Conflict: An Experiment," MPRA Paper 105690, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bruckner, Dominik & Sahm, Marco, 2023. "Party Politics: A Contest Perspective," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277714, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Katsuya Kobayashi & Hideo Konishi, 2021.
"Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 205-221, February.
- Hideo Konishi & Katsuya Kobayashi, 2020. "Effort Complementarity and Sharing Rules in Group Contests," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1024, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Iryna Topolyan, 2016. "The Max‐Min Group Contest: Weakest‐link (Group) All‐Pay Auction," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(1), pages 105-125, July.
- Brouwer, Thijs & Potters, Jan, 2019.
"Friends for (almost) a day: Studying breakaways in cycling races,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 75(PB).
- Brouwer, Thijs & Potters, Jan, 2019. "Friends for (almost) a day : Studying breakaways in cycling races," Other publications TiSEM 87e430ce-6c73-47be-b0e1-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Dripto Bakshi & Indraneel Dasgupta, 2021. "Internal vs. external rent-seeking with in-group inequality and public good provision," Discussion Papers 2021-06, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2023.
"How to preempt attacks in multi-front conflict with limited resources,"
European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 305(1), pages 493-500.
- Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2022. "How to preempt attacks in multi-front conflict with limited resources," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2022-09, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Hubert János Kiss & Alfonso Rosa-Garcia & Vita Zhukova, 2023. "Group contest in a coopetitive setup: experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 18(3), pages 463-490, July.
- Dasgupta, Indraneel & Pal, Sarmistha, 2021.
"Touch thee not: Group conflict, caste power and untouchability in rural India,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 442-466.
- Dasgupta, Indraneel & Pal, Sarmistha, 2018. "Touch Thee Not: Group Conflict, Caste Power, and Untouchability in Rural India," IZA Discussion Papers 12016, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Xiaotian Yang, 2022. "Coopetition for innovation in R&D consortia: Moderating roles of size disparity and formal interaction," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 79-102, March.
- Mingye Ma & Francesco Trevisan, 2023. "An Experiment on Inequality within Groups in Contest," Working Papers 2023: 30, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Send, Jonas, 2020. "Conflict between non-exclusive groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 858-874.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2016. "Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 959-971, December.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2020.
"Attacking and defending multiple valuable secrets in a big data world,"
European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 280(3), pages 1122-1129.
- Kai A. Konrad, 2019. "Attacking and Defending Multiple Valuable Secrets in a Big Data World," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2019-05, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Sung-Hoon Park & Jason F. Shogren, 2021. "A Virtuous Circle of Governance Contests with Externalities," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(14), pages 1-12, July.
- Avidit Acharya & Takuo Sugaya & Eray Turkel, 2022. "Electoral Campaigns as Dynamic Contests," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0293, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
- Bhan, Aditya & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2020. "Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation and Terror Activity," MPRA Paper 98484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series 6462, CESifo.
- Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "The social cost of contestable benefits," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-11, CIRANO.
- Roman M. Sheremeta, 2018.
"Behavior In Group Contests: A Review Of Experimental Research,"
Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(3), pages 683-704, July.
- Sheremeta, Roman, 2015. "Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research," MPRA Paper 67515, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Roman M. Sheremeta, 2015. "Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research," Working Papers 15-21, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Barbieri, Stefano & Malueg, David A., 2016. "Private-information group contests: Best-shot competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 219-234.
- Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg & Iryna Topolyan, 2014. "The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 603-640, November.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Wu, Qinggong, 2018. "A simple model of competition between teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 372-392.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2015. "The Group All-Pay Auction with Heterogeneous Impact Functions," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 069, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Johannes Münster, 2009. "Group contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 41(2), pages 345-357, November.
- Sheremeta, Roman, 2009. "Essays on Experimental Investigation of Lottery Contests," MPRA Paper 49888, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Brookins, Philip & Jindapon, Paan, 2021. "Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2016. "Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 959-971, December.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Max-Min Group Contest," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 050, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Baik, Kyung Hwan & Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2021. "Contests with multiple alternative prizes: Public-good/bad prizes and externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 103-116.
- Dongryul Lee & Pilwon Kim, 2022. "Group formation in a dominance-seeking contest," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(1), pages 39-68, January.
- Mercier, Jean-François, 2018. "Non-deterministic group contest with private information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 47-53.
- Dongryul Lee & Joon Song, 2019. "Optimal Team Contests to Induce More Efforts," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 20(3), pages 448-476, April.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Iryna Topolyan, 2016. "The Max‐Min Group Contest: Weakest‐link (Group) All‐Pay Auction," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(1), pages 105-125, July.
- Send, Jonas, 2020. "Conflict between non-exclusive groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 858-874.
- Indraneel Dasgupta & Ranajoy Guha Neogi, 2018.
"Between-group contests over group-specific public goods with within-group fragmentation,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(3), pages 315-334, March.
- Dasgupta, Indraneel & Neogi, Ranajoy Guha, 2017. "Between-Group Contests over Group-Specific Public Goods with Within-Group Fragmentation," IZA Discussion Papers 10881, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Boosey, Luke & Brookins, Philip & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2019.
"Contests between groups of unknown size,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 756-769.
- Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2017. "Contests between groups of unknown size," Working Papers wp2017_03_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
More about this item
Keywords
Contest; Collective decision; Group contest; Asymmetry; Internal conflict;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2011-04-09 (Game Theory)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uea:aepppr:2011_25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Cara Liggins (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/esueauk.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.