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Collective Action and Group Size Paradox

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Author Info
Esteban, J.
Ray, D.

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Abstract

The Olson Paradox referes to the observation that larger groups may be less successful in furthering their interests. We address the paradox within an explicit game-theoretic model of lobbying.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza in its series Papers with number 23.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:ieegpb:23

Contact details of provider:
Postal: El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza. Canton Grande, 9. 15003 La Coruña, Spain

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

Related research
Keywords: DECISION MAKING ; LOBBYING ; GAME THEORY;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

Cited by:
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  3. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2005. "Heterogenous Groups and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2005.16, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1. [Downloadable!]
  4. Cheikbossian, G., 2004. "Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized System," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2004.12, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1. [Downloadable!]
  5. Paul Pecorino, 2009. "Public goods, group size, and the degree of rivalry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 161-169, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2007. "On the size and structure of group cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 68-89, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2007. "Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 337-346, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2003. "On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within," Public Economics 0312005, EconWPA, revised 04 Mar 2004. [Downloadable!]
  9. Kunal Sengupta & Murali Agastya, 2004. "Extremes and Moderates: A Characterization and an Application to Lobbying," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 404, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  10. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2007. "Endogenous Coalition Formation in Contests," ESE Discussion Papers 158, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Echenique, Federico & Eguia, Jon X., 2005. "An explanation of inefficient redistribution: Transfers insure cohesive groups," Working Papers 1234, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  12. Orana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2005. "Cooperation in Collective Action," Natural Field Experiments 0013, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Debraj Ray & Jean-Marie Baland & Olivier Dagnelie, 2007. "Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects," Post-Print halshs-00160753_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Luis Corchón, 2007. "The theory of contests: a survey," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 69-100, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Kai A. Konrad & Wolfgang Leininger, 2007. "Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans," Ruhr Economic Papers 0016, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
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