Evolutionarily Stable Preferences in Contests
AbstractWe define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock) contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that the indirect evolutionary approach yields the same more aggressive behavior, too. This holds for any population size N, if evolution of preferences is determined by behavior in two-player contests. The evolutionarily stable preferences (ESP) of the indirect approach turn out to be negatively interdependent, thereby ”rationalizing” the more aggressive behavior.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2343.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
contests; preference evolution; evolutionary stability;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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- Burkhard Hehenkamp & Wolfgang Leininger & Alex Possajennikov, 2003.
"Evolutionary Equilibrium in Tullock Contests: Spite and Overdissipation,"
Discussion Papers in Economics, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics
03_01, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics.
- Hehenkamp, B. & Leininger, W. & Possajennikov, A., 2004. "Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 1045-1057, November.
- Wolfgang Leininger, 2003. "On evolutionarily stable behavior in contests," Economics of Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 177-186, November.
- T. Guse & B. Hehenkamp, 2006. "The strategic advantage of interdependent preferences in rent-seeking contests," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 323-352, December.
- Armen A. Alchian, 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 211.
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