Evolutionary Stability in Common Pool Resources
AbstractThe Tragedy of the Commons refers to the dissipation of a common- pool ressource when any appropriator has free access to it. Under the behavior of absolute payoff maximisation, the common-pool resource game leads to a Nash equilibrium in which the resource is overexploited. However, some empirical studies show that the overutilization is even larger than the Nash equilibrium predicts. We account for these results in an evolutionary framework. Under an imitation-experimentation dynamics, the long run stable behavior implies a larger exploitation of the resource than in the classical Nash equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of BETA with number 2008-21.
Date of creation: 2008
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common-pool resource; imitation behavior; evolutionary stable strategy; evolutionary games.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-09-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-09-29 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2008-09-29 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2008-09-29 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2008-09-29 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-09-29 (Game Theory)
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