This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Evolutionary stability and Nash equilibrium in finite populations, with an application to price competition

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Ana B. Ania ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Schaffer (1988) proposed a concept of evolutionary stability for finite-population models that has interesting implications in economic models of evolutionary learning, since it is related to perfectly competitive equilibrium. The present paper explores the relation of this concept to Nash equilibrium in particular classes of games, including constant-sum games, games with weak payoff externalities, and games where imitative decision rules are individually improving. An illustration of the latter is provided in the context of Bertrand oligopoly with homogeneous product which allows for a characterization of the set of evolutionarily stable prices.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0601.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 0601.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:0601

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Paper Administrator).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Tobias Guse & Burkhard Hehenkamp & Alex Possajennikov, 2008. "On the Equivalence of Nash and Evolutionary Equilibrium in Finite Populations," Discussion Papers 2008-06, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  2. Manfred Nermuth, 2008. "The Structure of Equilibrium in an Asset Market with Variable Supply," Vienna Economics Papers 0804, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can create your own reading lists on IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.