Are Tournaments Optimal over Piece Rates under Limited Liability for the Principal?
AbstractA highly acclaimed result in contract theory is that tournaments are superior to piece rate contracts when the agents are risk averse and their production activities are subject to a relatively large common shock. The reason is that tournaments allow the principal to trade insurance for lower income to the agents. Our analysis shows that this celebrated result does not carry over to the case when a limited liability constraint limits the payments the principal can make, provided that the liquidation value of the firm is sufficiently small. This finding has important implications for the vast number of limited liability firms. Tournaments are still optimal when the liquidation value of the firm is intermediate or large, even though the limited liability constraint is still binding for intermediate values. Surprisingly, uncertainty in the price of output strengthens the need for tournaments by expanding the range of liquidation values over which tournaments are optimal, because price uncertainty introduces additional bankruptcy risk.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by North Carolina State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 009.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2006
Date of revision: Sep 2006
piece rate contracts; tournaments; limited liability; bankruptcy; price uncertainty;
Other versions of this item:
- Marinakis, Kosmas & Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 2013. "Are tournaments optimal over piece rates under limited liability for the principal?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 223-237.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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- Matthias Krakel, 2006. "Tournaments versus Piece Rates under Limited Liability," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 5(3), pages 185-199, December.
- Kosmas Marinakis & Theofanis Tsoulouhas, 2012. "A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 105(2), pages 161-190, March.
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