This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Agent-Agents Problem: Payment by Relative Output

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Carmichael, H Lorne

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0734-306X%28198301%291%3A1%3C50%3ATAPPBR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.

Volume (Year): 1 (1983)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 50-65
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:1:y:1983:i:1:p:50-65

Contact details of provider:
Postal: The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005 Chicago, IL 60637
Fax: (773) 753-0811
Email:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/home.html

Order Information:
Web: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/order1.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Yeon-Seung Chung, 1990. "Sorting In Heterogeneous Contests," International Economic Journal, Korean International Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 71-89, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Edward P. Lazear, 1996. "Incentives in Basic Research," NBER Working Papers 5444, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. W Bentley Macleod, . "A Note on the Optimality of Bonus Pay," Canadian International Labour Network Working Papers 41, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Edward P. Lazear, 1986. "Incentive Contracts," NBER Working Papers 1917, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Robert Dur & Arjan Non & Hein Roelfsema, 2008. "Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-080/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Lazear, Edward P., 2003. "Output-Based Pay: Incentives, Retention or Sorting?," IZA Discussion Papers 761, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  7. Shasikanta Nandeibam, 1994. "A free-rider problem with a free-riding principal," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 227-250, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Son Kim & Cheng-Zhong Qin & Yan Yu, 2004. "Bribery in Rank-Order Tournaments," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series wp1-03, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
  9. repec:bep:eapcon:v:1:y:2002:i:1:p:1015-1015 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Eriksen, Kristoffer W. & Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2008. "Tournaments with prize-setting agents," Discussion Papers 2008/23, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2001. "Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising," NBER Working Papers 8416, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Kosmas Marinakis & Theofanis Tsoulouhas, 2006. "Are Tournaments Optimal over Piece Rates under Limited Liability for the Principal?," Working Paper Series 009, North Carolina State University, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
  13. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Olivier Cadot, 1997. "Career Concerns and the Acquisition of Firm-Specific Skills," CIG Working Papers FS IV 97-19, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc data is maintained by each archive holder on its own website. Nothing is held centrally.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-21.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.