Multi-battle contests

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Multi-battle contests

Author Info

Konrad, Kai A.
Kovenock, Dan

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Dan Kovenock

Abstract

We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of simultaneous move component contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each component contest is an all-pay auction with complete information. We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium analytically and demonstrate that it exhibits endogenous uncertainty. Even a large lead by one player does not fully discourage the other player, and each feasible state is reached with positive probability in equilibrium (pervasiveness). Expected effort in the component contests may be non-monotonic in the closeness of the race and realized individual effort may exceed the value of the prize by a factor that is proportional to the maximum number of stage victories required.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 66 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 256-274
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:1:p:256-274

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Paper
- Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2006. "Multi-battle contests," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1187, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2006. "Multi-battle contests," Discussion Papers 122, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Konrad, Kai A & Kovenock, Dan, 2006. "Multi-Battle Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 5645, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Fudenberg, Drew & Gilbert, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-31, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2005. "Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-of-War," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Konrad, Kai A & Kovenock, Dan, 2005. "Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-of-War," CEPR Discussion Papers 5205, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2006. "Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-of-War," Discussion Papers 121, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2005. "Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-Of-War," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1177, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Klumpp, Tilman & Polborn, Mattias K., 2006. "Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1073-1114, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Papers 8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
Other versions:
- Baye, Michael R. & Kovenock, Dan & Vries, Casper de, 1995. "The All-pay Auction with Complete Information," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
- Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G., 1995. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 311.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1007, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Varies, C.G., 1990. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Papers 9051, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
Budd, Christopher & Harris, Christopher & Vickers, John, 1993. "A Model of the Evolution of Duopoly: Does the Asymmetry between Firms Tend to Increase or Decrease?," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(3), pages 543-73, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Stefan Szymanski, 2003. "The Economic Design of Sporting Contests," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1137-1187, December.
Garfinkel, M.R. & Skaperdas, S., 2000. "Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: how the Future Matters," Papers 99-00-11, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
Other versions:
- Michelle R Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000011, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1999. " The Incidence of Overdissipation in Rent-Seeking Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(3-4), pages 439-54, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 1997. "The Incidence of Overdissipation in Rent-Seeking Contests," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-045/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
Harris, Christopher & Vickers, John, 1987. "Racing with Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(1), pages 1-21, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1992. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction," Papers 9-92-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
Other versions:
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "Rigging The Lobbying Process: An Application Of The All- Pay Auction," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1002, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 289-94, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Thomas Hoehn & Stefan Szymanski, 1999. "The Americanization of European football," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 14(28), pages 203-240, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(03), pages 379-414, June. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Fearon, James D, 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, Summer.
Harris, Christopher & Vickers, John, 1985. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(2), pages 193-209, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Konrad, Kai A & Kovenock, Dan, 2006. "Multi-Stage Contests with Stochastic Ability," CEPR Discussion Papers 5844, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Konrad, Kia A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2006. "Multi-Stage Contests with Stochastic Ability," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1192, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Dmitry Ryvkin, 2009. "Fatigue in dynamic tournaments," Working Papers wp2009_06_03, Department of Economics, Florida State University. [Downloadable!]

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