A contest architecture specifies how the prize sum is split among several prizes, and how the contestants (who are here privately informed about their abilities) are split among several sub-contests. We compare the performance of such schemes to that of grand winner-take-all contests from the point of view of designers who maximize either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. An important explanatory variable is the form of the agents` cost functions. The analysis is based on simple but powerful results about various stochastic dominance relations among order statistics and functions thereof.
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Paper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications with number
02-06.
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Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2005.
"Contests for Status,"
Discussion Papers
139, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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Heidrun C. Hoppe & Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2005.
"The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals,"
Discussion Papers
85, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Derek J. Clark & Kai A. Konrad, 2005.
"Contests with multi-tasking,"
Discussion Papers
125, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich, revised May 2006.
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Frode Meland & Odd Straume, 2007.
"Outsourcing in contests,"
Public Choice,
Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 315-331, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2006.
"Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-of-War,"
Discussion Papers
121, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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